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Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform
Bradley A. Smitht
Very few aspects of American politics fit the metaphor of Plato's cave
better than the realities of American campaign finance.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, efforts to reform the campaign finance
system have been exceptionally popular with both the general public2 and
legal academics,3 and few commentators have argued against the need for
some kind of reform. Most reformers have attempted to limit alleged political
"corruption" and to promote a brand of political equality. Taking an
instrumentalist view of the First Amendment, they have chafed at the more
libertarian First Amendment approach to campaign finance taken by the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.4
This Essay argues that reform scholarship has erred in its assumptions
about the causes and effects of political corruption. It challenges the basic
t Assistant Professor, Capital University Law School.
I. FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 26 (1992).
2. For examples of reform advocacy outside legal circles, see ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND
MONEY: THE NEv ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983); PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN
BUY (1988). Over 400 newspapers editorialized in favor of campaign finance reform in 1988. HERBERT
E. ALEXANDER & MONICA BAUER, FINANCING THE 1988 ELECTION 113 (1991). In the 1994 elections,
Missouri, Montana, and Oregon passed referenda limiting contributions in support of state legislative
candidates to just $100. A similar measure passed in Washington, D.C., in 1992. See Alversie Mitchell &
Doug Funderburk, We Must Finish Campaign Finance Overhaul, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 14, 1995, at
C7. However, voters in Colorado defeated a similar proposal. See id.
3. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 348-60 (1989); Marlene A. Nicholson, Continuing the Dialogue on
Campaign Finance Reform: A Response to Roy Schotland, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 463, 471-82 (1992); Fred
Wertheimer & Randy Huwa, Campaign Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future Challenges, 10
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43 (1980-81); Fred Wertheimer & Susan NV. Manes, Campaign Finance
Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1149-57 (1994). This
is but the tip of an enormous iceberg of legal literature urging restrictions on campaign spending,
contributions, or both.
4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). For examples of this instrumentalist view, see, e.g., J. Skelly
Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 625-42 (1982). For an example of a broader instrumentalist view, see Owen M.
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
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assumptions of campaign finance reform advocates, rather than the mechanics
or structure of regulation. Further, this Essay argues that it is actually
campaign finance regulation that is in conflict with accepted notions of
equality, so much so as to be broadly characterized as undemocratic.
Regulatory reform efforts thus fail to accomplish even those goals that, under
the reformers' instrumentalist First Amendment theory, justify limitations on
speech. Beyond asserting the failure of the reformers' program on their own
.terms, this Essay argues that First Amendment protection, applied
unflinchingly to political activity such as campaign contributions and spending,
is not a barrier to greater political equality or to the rooting out of corruption,
but is a considered instrumentalist response to these problems.
The longstanding agenda of the campaign finance reform movement has
been to lower the cost of campaigning, reduce the influence of special interests
in both elections and the legislative process, and open up the political system
to change. Reformers have sought to accomplish this primarily through
campaign contribution and expenditure limits and, ultimately, through public
funding of political campaigns. In 1974, the reform movement seemed to
achieve its greatest victory with the passage of major amendments to the
Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA).6 Many FECA provisions were soon
echoed in state legislation around much of the nation. Yet the reformist
agenda remained unfulfilled. Between 1977 and 1992, congressional campaign
spending increased by 347%.8 Congressional election contributions by political
action committees (PACs) increased from $20.5 million in 19769 to $189
million in 1994.10 Since 1974, the number of federal PACs has increased
from 6081 to over 4500.12 House incumbents, who in 1976 outspent
challengers by a ratio of 1.5 to 1, in 1992 outspent challengers by almost 4 to
5. Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1357 (1994); Wertheimer & Huwa, supra note 3, at 45.
6. Wertheimer & Huwa, supra note 3, at 45.
7. Many of FECA's provisions, however, were quickly declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Reform
advocates have, with some justification, argued that Buckley's elimination of some of FECA's most
important provisions explains the apparent failure of reform efforts. I will attempt to show that, even apart
from the Buckley Court's holding, FECA was inherently flawed.
8. Spending Explodes Since Reform, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, June-July 1993, at 1, 1. However,
spending did level off, and even declined in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars, in the late 1980s. See David
S. Broder, Campaign Finance Farce, WASH. POST, May 3, 1992, at C7.
9. Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties and Political Action Committees: Two Life Cycles, 22 ARIz. L.
REV. 445, 451 (1980).
10. Final Tabulations: PACs Contributed $189.4 Million to Congressional Candidates During 1993-94
Election Cycle, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Apr. 12, 1995, at 1,1.
11. Wertheimer & Huwa, supra note 3, at 48.
12. A. Martin Willis, Penniless PACs: Why Do They Bother to Exist?, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov.
9, 1994, at 1, 3 (indicating number of PACs filing Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports in first IS
months of election cycle).
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1.13 Meanwhile, incumbent reelection rates reached record highs in the House
in 1984 and 1988, before declining slightly in the 1990s."
Despite the apparent failings of the 1974 FECA amendments, critics of
reform measures have generally accepted, at least on a theoretical level, that
reform can accomplish its goals. 15 Rather, their objections to reform have
focused either on the First Amendment, 16 or on the difficulty of controlling
for "unintended consequences."
17
However, the problem with campaign finance reform is not merely
unanticipated consequences; rather, at their core, reform efforts are based on
faulty assumptions and are, in fact, irretrievably flawed. 8 Reform proposals
inherently favor certain political elites, support the status quo, and discourage
grassroots political activity. Even if these proposals worked as intended, they
would have an undemocratic effect on American elections.
Part II of this Essay provides a brief historical overview of campaign
finance patterns. The legal literature on campaign finance reform is happily
uncluttered by any serious consideration of life much before FECA's 1974
amendments. Therefore, a brief review of the historical patterns of campaign
finance is necessary to place in perspective the reformers' claims of a serious
13. Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1133.
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390,
1402 tbl. 2 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985). Professor BeVier finds reformists' legal
arguments lacking under traditional First Amendment analysis. However, BeVier admits that she "has
deliberately not addressed what is of course the most profound issue: whether political freedom as we have
known it can in principle be reconciled with active legislative pursuit of equality of political influence."
Id. at 1090.
16. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 15; Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust,
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 41 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) (invoking concepts
of natural rights and property rights as well as speech rights in opposition to regulation of campaign
finance); Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SuP. CT. REv.
I (arguing that campaign contributions should be considered speech entitled to full First Amendment
protection).
17. See, e.g., Michael J. Malbin, Looking Back at the Future of Campaign Finance Reform: Interest
Groups and American Elections, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FINANCING ELECTIONS
IN THE 1980s 232,232 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984); Roy A. Schotland, Proposals for Campaign Finance
Reform: An Article Dedicated to Being Less Dull Than Its 7itle, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 429, 436-37 (1992);
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1390. Schotland and Sunstein generally support reform efforts, but argue that
reformers have not been sensitive enough to manipulation of reform by incumbents, see Schotland, supra,
at 443; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1400, and the possibility that campaign finance laws might be
circumvented, see id. at 1403-11. Stephen Gottlieb, whose critique comes closest to my own, expresses
broad concern that reformers have promoted major changes in our democratic processes without a solid
understanding of the empirical results of proposed reforms. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of
Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HoFSTRA L. REv. 213, 213-14 (1989). He suggests that there is
simply no way to define in advance the resources that any group deserves, and that all proposals to limit
spending and contributions will therefore produce unintended consequences that are often detrimental, "both
to the goals of the reformers and the values traditionally cherished in first amendment jurisprudence." Id.
at 214-16.
18. This Essay will focus primarily on the regulation of federal campaigns, recognizing that many
states have adopted similar regulatory schemes with similar negative effects. These state laws share the
assumptions and basic structure of the federal regime. For a brief summary of state regulation, see FRANK
SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 285-90 (1988).
The Yale Law Journal
modem-day "crisis" in American democracy and to provide a background
against which to evaluate reformist assumptions about the role and effects of
money. Part III discusses the reformers' basic assumptions and identifies their
weaknesses. Part IV describes how campaign finance reform based on these
faulty assumptions leads to political results that can be broadly characterized
as undemocratic. Part V argues that public financing of elections suffers from
the same weaknesses as does campaign finance reform in general. The Essay
concludes with the suggestion that the policy difficulties that allegedly
necessitate substantial campaign finance regulation are already addressed
through the First Amendment, which provides for robust freedom of action and
debate in the political arena. The First Amendment ought to be examined not
as a libertarian constitutional barrier blocking necessary regulation, but as a
considered response to the problems of political corruption and equality and,
therefore, the problems posed by campaign finance.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FINANCING AND REGULATION OF
AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS
The debate in legal journals over campaign finance regulation is carried
on with surprisingly little awareness of the history of financing elections.' 9
History, however, can be useful in putting supposedly modem issues in
perspective. It sometimes seems that supporters of campaign finance would be
shocked to discover that our nation survived for over one hundred years with
no campaign finance laws.20 Reformers often operate on the assumption that
American democracy faces a unique modem crisis caused by the influence of
money in politics.21 In fact, reformist concerns are not new. The current
campaign finance "crisis" is in fact nothing of the sort, but instead the result
of public misperceptions, fueled by the rhetorical fervor of campaign finance
reform advocates.
19. For example, one can peruse four recent symposia on campaign finance reform and find no
reference at all to how political campaigns were funded prior to World War II. See Symposium on
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126 (1994); Symposium on Political Expression, 21 CAP.
U. L. REV. 381 (1992); Frameworks of Analysis and Proposals for Reform: A Symposium on Campaign
Finance, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1989); Symposium, Money in Politics: Political Campaign Finance
Reform, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 463 (1983).
20. Professor Roy Schotland relates an amusing story about Eugene McCarthy, in which McCarthy
imagines Common Cause founder John Gardner sitting with Thomas Jefferson at the writing of the
Declaration of Independence. Jefferson turns to Gardner and says,
"Well, John, how's this: 'We pledge our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor'... Quite
fine, is it not?"
"Yes Tom ... but I believe it would be finer if it read 'We pledge our lives, our sacred honor, and
our fortunes up to $1,000 per annum."'
Schotland, supra note 17, at 438 n.18.
21. See, e.g., the title of Fred Wertheimer's most recent piece, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy. See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3. Wertheimer argues that
dependency on special interest money is "central to the crisis in public confidence that faces our
government" and is a "fundamental problem of our political system." Id. at 1127.
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In early U.S. elections, most campaign expenses were paid directly by the
candidates. Such expenses were relatively minimal, going toward an occasional
campaign pamphlet and, especially in the South, food and drink for voters at
public gatherings and rallies.22 Candidates did not "run" for election, but
"stood" for office, relying on their reputations and personal recommendations
to carry them to victory.23 Though free from the "corrupting" effects of
money, elections in this early period were generally contested by candidates
representing aristocratic factions standing for election before a relatively small,
homogeneous electorate of propertied white men.
This genteel system of upper-class politics began to change in 1828, when
Martin Van Buren organized the first popular mass campaigns around Andrew
Jackson and the Democratic party. It was Van Buren's democratization of the
process that created the need for significant campaign spending. Money
became necessary not only for the traditional expenditures on food and liquor,
but also for newspaper advertisements, widespread pamphleteering, rallies, and
logistical support. 24 Even these new, mass parties, however, obtained
financing from a small number of sources. Funding for the new style of public
campaigning initially came from those who benefited most directly from
gaining or retaining power-government employees. Absent a professional
civil service, most government employees depended for their jobs on their
party's staying in office. It became common practice to assess these employees
a percentage of their salaries to support their party's campaigns? 5 Similarly,
would-be officeholders allied with the opposition served as a major source of
challengers' funds.26 In 1878, roughly ninety percent of the money raised by
the Republican congressional committee came from assessments on federal
officeholders.27 However, after the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883,
which created a federal civil service, and the adoption of similar laws in the
states, campaign money from assessments on officeholders gradually dried
up.28 Only then did politicians look for new sources of funds. Two dominant
groups of donors emerged: wealthy individuals and corporations.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, government regulation and
corporate growth formed a symbiotic relationship. The acceleration of Northern
industrialization that accompanied and followed the Civil War created the new
phenomenon of the large, national corporation. Wartime government contracts
22. GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE? 25 (1973).
23. ROBERT E. MTrrCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW at xv (1988).
24. See DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 17-21 (1993); NATHAN MILLER,
STEALING FROM AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CORRUPTION FROM JAMESTOWN TO REAGAN 116-17 (1992).
25. See MUTCH, supra note 23, at xvi; THAYER, supra note 22, at 38.
26. See SORAUF, supra note 1, at 2-3.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also JAMES K. POLLOCK, JR., PARTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS 113-25 (1926) (providing detailed
description of methods used to collect such assessments and of slow decline in assessments' importance
after introduction of civil service reform).
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and increasingly common land and cash grants to railroad companies created
the foundations for many of these enterprises.2 9 Corporations also benefited
as Republican Congresses sheltered many industries behind high tariff walls.3"
To tame the corporate power it had helped to create, Congress expanded the
sphere of federal regulation. Thus, for example, it created the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1881 and passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in
1890. Simultaneously, state regulation of railroad rates, business competition,
and working conditions became common.3'
With the growth of state and federal government powers, including the
increased regulation and subsidization of industry, corporate America
recognized the need for increased political participation.32 The stated goal was
not to buy legislative votes, but to elect candidates supportive of corporate
interests.33 In 1888, roughly 40% of Republican national campaign funds
came from Pennsylvania manufacturing and business interests.34 State parties
were probably even more reliant on corporate funding. By 1904, corporate
contributions constituted over 73% of Theodore Roosevelt's presidential
campaign funds. The Democratic party relied less on corporate contributions
but was also heavily dependent on financing from the personal wealth of a
handful of prominent businessmen. Industrialist Thomas Fortune Ryan
($450,000) and banker Augustus Belmont ($250,000) contributed roughly
three-quarters of the Democrats' 1904 presidential campaign fund; Henry
Davis, a mine owner and the party's vice-presidential candidate, was another
substantial contributor.35 Twenty-four years later, in 1928, the Democratic
National Committee still received 69.7%, and the Republican National
Committee received 68.4%, of their contributions in amounts of $1000 or
more.
36
Growing concern about alleged corporate domination of the political
process created a demand for regulation, and the first state laws regulating
campaign finance were passed in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
These laws were typically limited to minimal requirements to disclose
29. Lloyd J. Mercer, Railroad Land Grants, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY AND
BIOGRAPHY: RAILROADS IN THE AGE OF REGULATION, 1900-1980, at 353 (Keith L. Bryant, Jr. ed., 1988).
30. Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L. REV. 285,
286 (1986).
31. See, e.g., STUART CHASE, GOVERNMENT IN BUSINESS 25 (1935).
32. THAYER, supra note 22, at 30-31.
33. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALMORE & BARBARA G. SALMORE, CANDIDATES, PARTIES AND
CAMPAIGNS: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 29 (1985) (noting willingness of business to spend large
sums in 1896 to protect itself from "the populist threat"); THAYER, supra note 22, at 49 ("[B]usinessmen
flocked enthusiastically to McKinley because he was one of them.").
34. MUTCH, supra note 23, at xvii.
35. Id. at 3. Ryan and Belmont were good for another $80,000 and $250,000, respectively, in 1908.
THAYER, supra note 22, at 54. Candidates such as Davis were often expected to finance a portion of their
own campaign as a cost of gaining the party's nomination. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 2-3.
36. SORAUF, supra note 1. at 3 (citing LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 133 (1932)). In
1928, $1000 was enough to pay cash for two new automobiles. Id.
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campaign donations and expenditures, although four states went so far as to
ban all corporate contributions beginning in the 1890s." 7 The first federal law,
a narrow provision banning some corporate contributions, was passed in
1907.38 Over the next six decades, the federal government passed several laws
requiring the disclosure of contributions and the filing of reports, but these
laws remained generally toothless and were largely ignored. 9
Most campaigns continued to be funded by small groups of donors.
Although a handful of candidates, such as Barry Goldwater in 1964, were able
to raise large sums from a broad base of small donors, large contributions
continued to dominate campaign fund-raising. 0 In 1968, for example,
insurance executive Clement Stone and his wife contributed $2.8 million to
Richard Nixon's successful presidential campaign.'
Gifts such as the Stones', plus the perceived need to "do something" in the
wake of the Watergate scandal, brought about the 1974 FECA amendments,
the toughest and most thorough federal campaign-regulation measures ever
passed.42 The 1974 amendments limited individual, political party, and PAC
contributions to candidates, limited personal spending by candidates, placed
ceilings on overall campaign spending for federal offices, and limited
independent spending by groups not affiliated with a candidate or campaign.43
The 1974 amendments also established the public funding mechanism for the
presidential election of federal matching funds for primary candidates and
federal funds for the general-election campaign.44
In fact, the comprehensive scheme enacted in the 1974 amendments was
never fully implemented. In Buckley v. Valeo,45 the Supreme Court struck
down on First Amendment grounds the limits on independent spending, limits
on a candidate's spending of personal funds, and mandatory campaign
spending ceilings. Only the contribution limits, the disclosure requirements,
and the voluntary system of public funding of presidential races survived the
legal challenge.46 Nevertheless, the basic FECA framework remains at the
core of most campaign finance reform proposals: limits on contributions, limits
on total spending, and the use of public funding. Some reformers argue for
37. MUTCH, supra note 23, at xvii.
38. Id. at 1-8.
39. SORAUF, supra note I, at 5-6. Sorauf notes that there was not a single prosecution under the 1925
federal disclosure law, ultimately repealed in 1971. Id. at 6. For a detailed account of the evolution of
federal law prior to 1971, see MUTcH, supra note 23, at 1-42.
40. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 3-4.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 4-9.
43. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
44. Id.
45. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
46. See id. at 3-5.
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outright reversal of the Court's Buckley decision,47 while others have
attempted to design contribution and spending limits within the confines of
Buckley.48 Underlying these different approaches is the common theme that
contribution and spending limits are necessary to reduce the influence of large
contributors within the political system and thereby to address the current
"crisis."
The belief that modem campaigns have been corrupted by big money in
some unprecedented manner simply does not square with historical fact. The
role of the small contributor in financing campaigns may border on
insignificant, but it has increased, rather than declined, over the years. For
most voters, familiarizing themselves with the candidates and voting in
elections have always been the extent of their political involvement. Thus, for
over 200 years, candidates have relied on a small base of donors who hoped
to benefit directly from their preferred candidates' election, whether through
a public appointment or a higher tariff. When reformers suggest that money is
"distorting" our election process,49 it is not clear to what norm they refer.5
It has been suggested that the modem "American Dilemma" is the conflict
between our acceptance of economic inequalities and our commitment to
political equality.5' However, this brief history of campaign finance patterns
illustrates that such tension has long existed in elections, though campaign
finance reformers now argue that it has created a "crisis" of American
democracy.52 Indeed, the rhetoric of reform has changed little since the early
part of this century.5 3 It is hard, then, to blame the recent failure to enact
reform legislation for any current "crisis."
47. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1324 (1994);
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1400; Wright, supra note 4, at 644-45.
48. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 351-60.
49. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 84 (1993) ("Many people think that the
present system of campaign financing distorts the system of free expression .... "); Paul G. Chevigny, The
Paradox of Campaign Finance, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 206, 226 (1981) (book review) ("[T]o continue the
present system of campaign financing ... is to perpetuate a system by which money skews the democratic
process.").
50. BeVier, supra note 15, at 1073-74.
51. See Schotland, supra note 17, at 435 (alluding to GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944)).
52. 1 do not propose to address in this Essay various arguments that the United States is a repressive
society in which a small ruling class has controlled the masses through a corrupt political and economic
system. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY (1994). Nor do I attempt, in this Essay, to
rebut the recently argued proposition that the Constitution actually requires public funding of the electoral
process. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superioriy of
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1160, 1164-74 (1994). The former critique
represents a fundamental challenge to our society that goes far beyond campaign finance. The latter is an
interesting proposition that cannot be fairly addressed in this Essay, other than to point out that if my
criticisms of public financing and limits on private spending are correct, Raskin and Bonifaz's argument
must fall, based as it is on the premise that the Constitution requires a "democratic" method of elections
that cannot be attained absent public financing. See id.
53. See. e.g., OVERACKER, supra note 36, at 376 ("Unless we can find substitute sources for financing
campaigns, popular control is threatened.").
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In fact, one might go even further and speculate that existing campaign
finance reform is contributing to the current crisis of confidence in
government. It is over the past thirty years, simultaneously with the growth of
campaign finance regulation, that public confidence in government has
plunged.54 I certainly do not mean to suggest that the perceived crisis of
confidence is solely, or even primarily, caused by campaign finance regulation.
Correlation must not be confused with causation, and Vietnam, Watergate,
Abscam, Iran-Contra, Waco, bounced checks, absurd regulation, 55 the
unchecked growth of federal spending and debt, and any number of other
factors are equal or more plausible candidates to explain the decline of
confidence in the government. But where the prescribed remedy seems to
correlate with the rise of the disease, it is only prudent to reexamine the
assumptions upon which that remedy is based.56
Reformers have failed to show why a system of campaign finance that has
existed throughout the nation's history must be overturned. They have failed
to prove that new, unique circumstances justify infringement of First
Amendment rights, or even that these infringements will cure the alleged ills.
Professor Lowenstein has argued, with some merit, that opponents of reform
have subjected reformers' proposals to a higher level of scrutiny than these
critics could themselves withstand. But reformers justifiably face such a
heavy burden. It is they who seek to change longstanding norms of campaign
financing and political activity. It is they who seek to impose an ever growing
list of First Amendment infringements on society. The next part analyzes the
validity of the assumptions that, according to the reformers, justify such First
Amendment infringements.
II. FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORMERS
Four general assumptions underlie the arguments made in favor of
campaign finance regulation: First, there is too much money being spent in
54. See Ronald Brownstein, Clinton's Job One: Reversing the Anti-Government Tide, PUB. PERSP.,
May/June 1994, at 3, 3-4.
55. Quibblers on this point are directed to PHILIP K. HOvARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How
LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994). I assume that the other items in this list need no citation.
56. Reformers argue, correctly, that Buckley v. Valeo prevented a comprehensive reform system from
ever taking shape by striking down spending limits and limits on independent expenditures. However, given
that the Court has shown no sign of retreating from Buckley, reformers must consider their proposals, and
the likely consequences thereof, within the Buckley framework. Furthermore, while we cannot be certain
what the empirical data might show had Buckley left the entire FECA scheme intact, it should be apparent
to the reader on a theoretical level that most of the negative consequences of campaign finance reform
efforts would apply regardless of Buckley. A few, obviously, would not, such as the tendency of
contribution limits, coupled with no limits on candidate personal spending, to favor wealthy candidates. But
most would apply, often more strongly, given that the 1974 FECA reforms were based on the flawed
assumptions identified in this Essay. See Sorauf, supra note 5, at 1356. For an example of the misguided
literature in the debate leading up to the passage of the 1974 legislation, see JOHN W. GARDNER, IN
COMMON CAUSE 33-40, 55-57 (1972).
57. See Lowenstein. supra note 3, at 303-04.
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political campaigns; 58 second, campaigns based on small contributions are, in
some sense, more democratic, more in touch with the "people," than
campaigns financed through large contributions;59 third, money buys
elections, presumably in a manner detrimental to the public good; 60 and
fourth, money is a corrupting influence on the legislature.61 Given these
assumptions, it is believed that the end result of an unregulated finance system
will be a political process increasingly dominated by wealthy individuals
whose interests are at odds with those of ordinary citizens.62 But are these
assumptions warranted? This part of the Essay will examine each of them in
turn and conclude that each one is seriously flawed.
A. Assumption One: Too Much Money Is Spent on Campaigns
One often hears that too much money is spent on political campaigns.
63
The language in which campaigns are described in the general press constantly
reinforces that perception. Candidates "amass war chests" with the help of
58. See GARDNER, supra note 56, at 38, 56.
59. See id. at 55.
60. Cf. id. at 38-39 (arguing that candidates must appeal to monied interests).
61. See id. at 41-42.
62. See DREW, supra note 2, at 5; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1392-93; Wertheimer & Manes, supra
note 3, at 1126-27.
63. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 17, at 443. This view is certainly popular among the general
public. One recent poll found that 90% of respondents agreed with the proposition that "'there's way too
much money in politics."' Terry Ganey, To Campaign Finance Reform Advocates, the Webster Scandal
Was Proof Positive Proposition A Would Limit Donations, Aiming to Cut Big Money's Political Role, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 1994, at lB. I poll my students on the first day of my election law class,
and have found that approximately 75% will "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement, "Too much
money is spent on political campaigns."
Nevertheless, Professor Nicholson agrees that spending on campaigns is not excessive and suggests
that such an argument is a "non-battle .... No thoughtful student of campaign finance will dispute...
this point, despite the fact that demagogues may occasionally still argue to the contrary." Nicholson, supra
note 3, at 473; see also Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 350 (arguing that restricting PAC contributions would
require replacement source of revenue). However, as Professor Nicholson also notes, "reform proposals
designed by Democrats in Congress routinely include overall expenditure limitations." Nicholson, supra
note 3, at 473. While Nicholson may be convinced that we do not spend too much on campaigns, many
reformers are not. See, e.g., Debra Burke, Tiventy Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974: Look Who's Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 375-76 (1995); Wertheimer &
Manes, supra note 3, at 1132-33; Kenneth J. Levit, Note, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of
Buckley v. Valeo, 103 YALE LJ. 469, 473 (1993) ("[Buckley] ignored the role excessive campaign
spending plays in compromising the electorate's confidence in the democratic process."); see also Sorauf,
supra note 5, at 1357 ("[A] consensus agenda for mainstream reform ... includes.., a reduction in the
total sums being raised and spent on contemporary campaigns .... ).
Furthermore, even reformers such as Nicholson tend to favor contribution limits. As Professor
Lowenstein has discussed, such limits, set low enough, will have the effect of restricting overall spending.
See Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After
Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 399-401 (1992). Most reform proposals include contribution limits. And
Professor Nicholson herself is ready to accept overall spending limits as part of a reform package. See
Nicholson, supra note 3, at 475.
Thus, less careful reformers and much of the public believe that too much is spent; more thoughtful
reformers may not believe that too much is spent, but they see little harm in further restricting spending.
Either way, the assumption is incorrect.
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"special interests" that "pour" their "millions" into campaigns. "Obscene"
expenditures "careen" out of control or "skyrocket" upwards."4 This language
notwithstanding, there is actually good cause to believe that we do not spend
enough on campaigns.
The assertion that too much money is spent on campaigning essentially
begs the question: Compared to what? Compared to yogurt or potato chips?
Americans spend more than twice as much money each year on yogurt,65 and
two to three times as much on the purchase of potato chips,66 as they do on
political campaigns. In the two-year election cycle culminating in the elections
of November 1994, approximately $590 million was spent by all congressional
general-election candidates combined. 67 Although this set a new record for
spending in congressional races, the amount is hardly exorbitant, amounting
to roughly $3 per eligible voter spent over the two-year period between
elections. Total direct campaign spending for all local, state, and federal
elections, including congressional elections, over the same period can be
reasonably estimated as between $1.5 and $2.0 billion, or somewhere between
$7.50 and $10 per eligible voter over the two-year cycle.68 When one
64. See, e.g., SORAUF, supra note 1, at 26; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1132-33.
65. See George F. Will, So We Talk Too Much, NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1993, at 68, 68 (observing that
total cost of 1992 congressional races equaled 40% of what Americans spent on yogurt that year).
66. Clare Ansberry, The Best Beef Jerky Has Characteristics Few Can Appreciate, WALL ST. J., Apr.
4, 1995, at Al, A12 (noting annual spending on potato chips in excess of $4.5 billion).
67. Post-election Reports Point to New Records, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Dec. 28, 1994, at 1, 1
[hereinafter Post-election Reports]. This only includes total spending by victorious primary candidates. An
additional $76 million was spent by losing primary election candidates. Id. at 5.
68. Herbert Alexander and Anthony Corrado estimate total direct spending on all local, state, and
federal campaigns for the 1991-92 cycle (not including ballot issues and the presidential campaign) at
$1.543 billion. DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 478 (1995) (citing
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & ANTHONY CORRADO, FINANCING THE 1992 ELECTION (1995)). Approximately
$950 million is spent on party organization and administration and political action committee overhead. Id.
at 477-78. Spending on congressional races increased by roughly 17% from the 1991-92 to the 1993-94
cycle. Post-election Reports, supra note 67, at 1, 5. Applying a similar rate of increase to Alexander and
Corrado's figures for state and local races in 1991-92, total direct campaign spending at all levels in
1993-94 would have been approximately $1.8 billion.
In recent years, the reform literature has expressed growing concern about "soft money" in campaigns.
See, e.g., Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1144-48 (arguing that "soft money" threatens integrity
of presidential and congressional campaigns). In fact, "soft money" is a small part of total spending,
approximately $83 million in 1991-92, or about 4.5% of the amount of direct spending. Marty Jezer &
Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance and the Subversion of American Democracy, 8 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467, 489-90 (1994) (citing JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, SoFr MONEY, REAL
DOLLARS: SOFr MONEY IN THE 1992 ELECTIONS 3-4 (1993)). The arguments against soft money are the
same as those against direct contributions (though one additional criticism applicable to soft money and
not to other types of contributions is the absence of reporting requirements for soft money, see Wertheimer
& Manes, supra note 3, at 1144-45), and therefore do not change the terms of the debate. In fact, soft
money actually has several advantages over direct contributions. To the extent reformers are concerned
about the potential corrupting effects of campaign contributions, soft money, which is given to the parties,
should ameliorate that perceived problem. It allows parties to channel their funds into competitive races
and do generic party advertising, which may be beneficial for electoral competition, cf. Lowenstein, supra
note 3, at 354-55 (arguing that generic party advertising has potential to move political system toward
responsible party government), and it may increase party discipline by making candidates more reliant on
their parties, which many political scientists view as a good thing, see, e.g., LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLmCAL
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considers that this per-voter figure is spread over several candidates for which
that voter is eligible to cast a ballot, it is hard to suggest that office seekers are
spending "obscene" sums attempting to get their messages through to voters.
Comparisons to levels of corporate spending on product advertising help
to illustrate that spending on political campaigns is minimal. The sum of the
annual advertising budgets of Procter & Gamble and Philip Morris Company,
the nation's two largest advertisers, is roughly equal to the amount spent by
all federal and state political candidates and parties in a two-year election
cycle.69 The value of such comparisons can be disputed: If one views the
problem as the allegedly corrupting effect of campaign money, then the
suggestion that it may take less to buy politicians than to sell soap and tobacco
provides little comfort. But such numbers are useful to put political spending
into perspective when it is the raw levels of spending that are challenged, and
to consider the probable effect on political communication of reform measures
that would limit spending.7°
Increased campaign spending translates into a better-informed electorate.
Gary Jacobson's extensive studies have shown that "the extent and content of
information [voters] ... have has a decisive effect on how they vote."'7'
Voters' understanding of issues increases with the quantity of campaign
information received.72 In short, spending less on campaigns will result in less
public awareness and understanding of issues.
Accepting the premise that too much money is not being spent in absolute
terms, one searches for an explanation as to why the public perception differs
from the reality. It may be fairly suggested that the perception stems from a
belief that what money is spent is largely ineffective or even destructive. In
other words, the perceived problem, on closer examination, may not be that too
much is spent, but that too little benefit is received in return. In particular, high
PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 3 (1986) (noting that most observers view parties as "organizationally
desirable and probably essential in a democratic nation").
69. Schotland, supra note 17, at 444 (using 1987-88 data).
70. Also, one can have a lot of fun with such numbers. For example, Sony Music International will
spend some $30 million, or about the cost of Michael Huffington's 1994 U.S. Senate campaign, to promote
a Michael Jackson CD with the lyrics, "'Jew me, sue me, everybody do me, kick me, Kike me, don't you
black or white me."' See Sony's Statesmanship, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1995, at AI8. Or one can cite the
$100 million, more than the cost of a presidential campaign, being spent in 1995 to promote reruns of the
situation comedy, "Seinfeld." See Roxanne Roberts, The Remote Controllers; Meet the Folks Who Keep
You Tuned to Their Show, WASH. POST, June 10, 1995, at B!.
71. GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 31 (1980).
72. Gottlieb, supra note 17, at 266; see also Wertheimer & Huwa, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that
greater use of television advertising increases electorate's knowledge about candidates and issues and
stimulates interest in campaign) (citing Charles Atkin & Gary Heald, Effects of Political Advertising, 40
PUB. OPINION Q. 216, 228 (1976)). Kentucky officials reported a sharp decline in voter turnout and interest
in the 1995 gubernatorial primaries, the first state election after the state passed legislation that reduced
campaign spending in 1994. John Harwood, Kentucky's New Campaign-Finance Law Linits Donations as
Well as Interest in Governor's Race, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1995, at A16. However, turnout in the November
1995 general election was approximately 44%, about the same as in 1991. Al Cross, Final Tally Trims
Patton's Edge, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Nov. 28, 1995, at 3B.
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spending has been linked to many voters' disgust with what is perceived as the
relentless negativity of modem, televised campaign advertisements. 3
However, efforts to limit spending on campaigns--either directly, through
spending limits, or indirectly, through contribution limits-bear no relationship
to the negativity of the campaign, and may actually cause an increase in unfair,
negative campaigning. Less spending only reduces the amount of
communication; it does not mitigate any negative tone that the communication
might have. This reduction in the flow of information would tend to make
well-produced negative advertising more valuable, as candidates will need to
get the maximum political mileage from each expenditure, and as a poorly
informed electorate may be more susceptible to misleading political
advertisements. More perniciously, candidates who have reached a spending
limit, or who cannot tap proven supporters to raise additional funds, may be
unable to respond to late, unfair, negative assaults.
Moreover, it is a mistake to assume that the elimination of negative
campaigning would necessarily serve the public. Negative advertising that is
relevant to the issues can increase public awareness in a positive way. Bruce
Felknor notes that without negative campaigning aimed at underscoring an
opponent's bad side, "any knave or mountebank in the land may lie and steal
his or her way into the White House or any other elective office."74 He thus
distinguishes between "fair" and "unfair" campaigning, based on truth and
relevance.75 To suggest that candidates should not point to each other's
perceived shortcomings, writes Felknor, is "preposterous.'
76
There are no objective criteria by which to measure whether "too much"
is spent on political campaigns. What is spent on campaigns, one might fairly
suggest, is the amount that individuals feel it is worthwhile to contribute and
73. See, e.g., Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1130-31 (quoting former Senate Majority Leader
George Mitchell on campaign finance reform: "'[Americans] see a campaign finance system that places
tremendous money demands on those who run ... and a system dominated by negative campaigns."');
Peter F. May, Note, State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive
Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179, 187-89 (1992). This perception may itself be influenced by press
reporting and editorials critical of campaign advertising. See, e.g., John Balzar & Doug Conner, With Foley
Noble Era Will End, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al, A17 (asserting that negative ads, along with special
interest intrusion, constitute "the dark streak of American campaign politics"); Stuart Elliott, Ketchum
Protests PoliticalAds, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at D23 (quoting advertising executive as saying negative
ads are "'political filth that is not advertising and shouldn't be dignified by being called advertising"');
Charles Krauthammer, Political Suicide, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1994, at A27 (characterizing political
advertising as "virulent, scurrilous, wall-to-wall character assassination"); Robin Toner, Bitter Tone of the
'94 Campaign Elicits Worry on Public Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at AI (discussing negative tone
of 1994 campaign). But whether modem, televised campaign advertising is overly negative may simply be
a matter of individual voter preference. Negative advertising is popular for a simple reason: It works.
Indeed, as Bruce Felknor, former Executive Director of the Fair Campaign Practices Committee, has stated,
"without attention-grabbing, cogent, memorable, negative campaigning, almost no challenger can hope to
win unless the incumbent has just been found guilty of a heinous crime." BRUCE L. FELKNOR, POLITICAL
MISCHIEF: SMEAR, SABOTAGE, AND REFORM IN U.S. ELECTIONS 29 (1992).
74. FELKNOR, supra note 73, at 29.
75. Id. at 30.
76. Id. at 29.
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that candidates find it is effective to raise and spend. Considering the
importance of elections to any democratic society, it is hard to believe that
direct expenditures of approximately $10 per voter for all local, state, and
national campaigns, over a two-year period, constitutes a crisis requiring
limitations on spending.
B. Assumption Two: Campaigns Funded with Small Contributions Are
More Democratic
Within the reform movement lies a deep-rooted belief that democratic
political campaigns should be financed by small contributions.77 This position
is motivated by the belief that large contributions corrupt either or both the
electoral and legislative systems. Such a belief suggests that a campaign
funded through small contributions will in the end lead to less corruption.
However, small contributions are often seen as an end in themselves, on the
notion that even if money were not corrupting, small contributions epitomize
the American belief in self-government and participatory democracy. 78 This
notion of the campaign funded through small contributions as the embodiment
of representative democracy is unrealistic.
First, this vision appears to be based on an idealized image of democratic
politics. As shown in Part II, the burden of financing political campaigns has
always fallen on a small minority of the American public. Today, as many as
eighteen million Americans make some financial contribution to a political
party, candidate, or PAC in a given election cycle.79 "No other system of
campaign funding anywhere in the world enjoys so broad a base of
support."8 Yet this "broad base of support" amounts to only some 10% of
the voting-age population.8' With the exception of the occasional race with
a candidate who can whip up an ideological fervor on the fringe of mainstream
politics, such as George McGovern or Oliver North, Americans are simply
77. See Sorauf, supra note 5, at 1356.
78. Id.
79. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 29 (citing data from University of Michigan National Election Study of
1988 election). PACs are widely assailed as the ultimate villains in the reformers' frame of reality. See, e.g.,
Wertheimer & Huwa, supra note 3, at 48-53; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1136-40. In fact,
PACs are nothing more than an agglomeration of small contributors, many of whom might not contribute
to politics absent PAC solicitation. To the extent that reformers truly believe that campaigns should be
funded by small contributions, therefore, PACs ought to te viewed as a positive force. Cf LARRY J.
SABATO, PAYING FOR ELECTIONS 19-22 (1989) (arguing against limits on PAC donations).
80. SORAUF, supra note I, at 30.
81. Id. at 29 (citing data from University of Michigan National Election Study of 1988 election). This
figure has been quite stable for three decades. See generally Ruth S. Jones, Contributing as Participation,
in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 27 (Margaret L. Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990)
(observing that typically 10-12% percent of electorate donates to campaigns).
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unwilling, individually, to contribute enough money in small amounts to run
modem campaigns."
It is a mistake to assume that a broad base of contributors necessarily
makes a campaign in some way more representative or more attuned to the
popular will. Though the eighteen million who contribute to campaigns
constitute a far broader base of financial contributors than existed in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, few would argue that this has made the
political system more democratic or more responsive.83 Indeed, it is an article
of faith in reformist literature that our system has grown less responsive to
popular will in the last century. In fact, however, those candidates who have
been best able to raise campaign dollars in small contributions have often been
those who were most emphatically out of the mainstream of their time. Barry
Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign, for example, raised $5.8 million from
410,000 small contributors, before going down in a landslide defeat.' On his
way to an even more crushing defeat in 1972, George McGovern raised almost
$15 million from small donors, at an average of approximately $20 per
contributor." And if we assume that reliance on numerous small contributions
makes a campaign in some way more "democratic," then the most
"democratic" campaign of 1994 was the U.S. Senate campaign of Oliver
North. North raised approximately $20 million, almost entirely from small
contributors, and actually outspent his nearest rival by nearly 4 to 1.86 Yet he
still lost to an unpopular opponent plagued by personal scandal.8 7 All of these
campaigns were among the most prominent extremist candidacies in recent
decades. This suggests that the ability to raise large sums in small amounts is
a sign of fervent backing from a relatively small minority, rather than a sign
of broad public support. At the same time, truly mass-based political
82. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 348 (citing Gary Jacobson, Party Organization and Distribution
of Congressional Resources: Republicans and Democrats in 1982, 100 AM. POL. Scl. Q. 603, 610
(198546)).
83. Cf. Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1129-30 (citing polling data indicating public distrust
of politicians).
84. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 4.
85. Id. Segregationist George Wallace was another prominent figure who raised large sums in small
amounts: $5.8 million in contributions under $100 in his 1968 presidential run. Id.
86. It is interesting to note that despite his reliance on small donations from a large donor base, North
was roundly castigated by many campaign finance reformers for the high cost of his campaign. See, e.g.,
High-cost Campaigns, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1994, at 8A; Richard Roeper, Hofeld War Chest
Filled With Lost Opportunity, CHICAGO SUN-TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1994, at 9.
87. See Michael J. Malbin, Most GOP Winners Spent Enough Money to Reach Voters, POL. FIN. &
LOBBY REP., Jan. 11, 1995, at 8, 9.
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movements have historically relied on a relatively small number of large
contributors for "seed money," if not for the bulk of their funding.
88
Campaign finance reform efforts tend to overlook the significant collective
action problem that prevents most voters from giving financially to candidates.
Even if large contributions were totally banned, thereby increasing the relative
importance of small contributions, no single contribution would be likely to
have a significant impact on an election. 89 Voters, therefore, still have little
rational incentive to make contributions. This collective action problem may
be overcome by a radical campaign in which donors are motivated by ideology
rather than rational, utility-maximizing calculations. However, in most
instances, there will not be sufficient funds available to finance campaigns at
a level that informs the electorate unless a resort is made to public funds.90
Thus, a system of private campaign finance will almost inevitably come to rely
on large individual donors who believe that their substantial gift can make a
difference, and on interest groups (i.e., PACs) that overcome voter inertia by
organizing voters to address particular concerns.9'
C. Assumption Three: Money Buys Elections
The third assumption of campaign finance reform is that money "buys"
elections in some manner incompatible with a functioning democracy.92 It
seems axiomatic that a candidate with little or no money to spend is unlikely
to win most races. Furthermore, the candidate who spends more money wins
88. See Gottlieb, supra note 17, at 220-21; see also infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. Thayer
notes how such progressive turn-of-the-century candidates as Woodrow Wilson, Robert LaFollette, William
Jennings Bryan, and Hiram Johnson (who was elected on the slogan "Kick the corporations out of politics")
were financed by a small number of wealthy supporters. THAYER, supra note 22, at 54-57. Ross Perot has
recently announced his intention to create a new mass party, which will presumably rely on his millions
to get started.
89. Cf. Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1274 (1994) (noting that "pervasive collective action problems" discourage
Americans from following politics closely).
90. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 350.
91. BeVier, supra note 89, at 1274-75.
92. Within the reformist literature, there is some disagreement over the importance of this issue.
Professor Lowenstein, for one, seems relatively comfortable with large monetary contributions made as part
of an "electoral" strategy-that is, with the hope of electing sympathizers to office. See Lowenstein, supra
note 3, at 308-13. His primary concern is with contributors pursuing a "legislative" strategy, i.e., seeking
to influence, rather than to elect, a legislator. See id.; see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and
the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 791-95 (1985). Others seem equally or more
concerned with the idea of "buying elections" and with the importance of voter equality. See, e.g., David
A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1371-82
(1994); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1392. Reformers whose primary goal is to reduce the allegedly improper
influence of contributions on legislative decisionmaking will be less worried about efforts to elect a
candidate who agrees, in principle, with the donor. By contrast, reformers who see equality as the
fundamental goal of campaign finance reform will be concerned with efforts to "buy" elections. As
Professor Lowenstein notes, equality is an issue that appeals to most political liberals but has little appeal
to many conservatives, whereas the potentially corrupting influence of money is generally frowned upon
by observers of all political stripes. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 346.
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more often than not.93 But correlation is not the same as cause and effect, and
one must be careful not to make too much of such simple numbers. The
correlation between spending and victory may stem simply from the desire of
donors to contribute to candidates who are likely to win, in which case the
ability to win attracts money, rather than the other way around.94 Similarly,
higher levels of campaign contributions to, and spending by, a candidate may
merely reflect a level of public support that is later manifested at the polls.
95
Generally speaking, the same attributes that attract voters to a candidate will
attract donations, and those that attract donations will attract voters.96 In other
words, the candidate who is able to raise more money would usually win even
if that candidate could not spend the added money: The ability to raise money
is evidence of political prowess and popularity that would normally translate
into votes, regardless of spending.97
At the same time, higher spending does not necessarily translate into
electoral triumph. As Michael Malbin puts it, "Having money means having
the ability to be heard; it does not mean the voters will like what they
hear."98 One need only look at recent elections to prove his point. In the 1994
U.S. House elections, for example, many incumbents won while spending
considerably less than their opponents.99 More pointedly, the thirty-four
Republican challengers who defeated Democratic incumbents spent, on
average, only two-thirds of the amounts expended by their opponents,'00 and
one spent less than one-twentieth as much as did his incumbent opponent.''
Given the inherent advantages of incumbency, this is powerful evidence that
a monetary advantage alone does not mean electoral success.
In support of the assumption that money buys elections, some
commentators have recently expressed concern about the "war chest
mentality," the tendency of incumbents to amass large campaign funds well in
advance of a race in order to scare off challengers. 10 2 Recent research by
economists Philip Hersch and Gerald McDougall has found that a large
93. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM
20 (3d ed. 1984).
94. See STEPHANIE D. MOUSSALLI, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE CASE FOR DEREGULATION 4
(1990); Gary C. Jacobson, Money in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections, in MONEY AND POLITICS
IN THE UNITED STATES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN THE 1980s, supra note 17, at 38, 57.
95. MOUSSALLI, supra note 94, at 4.
96. See Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for
Old Arguments, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 342-43 (1990).
97. SoRAUF, supra note 18, at 161-64.
98. Malbin, supra note 87, at 9.
99. See Late Money in Key House Races, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Jan. 11, 1995, at 3, 5-6.
100. Malbin, supra note 87, at 9.
101. Money in House Seat Turnovers, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov. 23, 1994, at 3, 4.
102. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 47, at 1284-89.
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incumbent war chest does indeed correlate with a lower likelihood of a serious
challenge in U.S. House races.' 03
On closer examination, however, the war-chest argument is merely a
variation on the basic assumption that money is the primary determinant of
who wins office. In the "war chest" version, one candidate, usually the
incumbent, has simply raised cash early enough that opponents do not even try
to contest for the seat, recognizing that such a quest is unlikely to succeed. But
the war-chest argument, like the basic assumption that money buys elections,
still does not account for how or why the incumbent is able to raise large sums
early in the election cycle. Hersch and McDougall note that a large campaign
fund at an early date tends to indicate that the candidate is popular and has
other attributes that make a challenger unlikely to succeed.' °4 An early
accumulation of cash also demonstrates a determination by the candidate to run
a hard, competitive campaign. Thus a war chest may serve as a signal to
potential challengers that the incumbent is popular and determined, and that a
challenge is therefore unlikely to succeed. At the same time, it helps to explain
why we might not expect a strong challenge even in the absence of a war
chest: Good candidates will not waste energy challenging a popular
incumbent.'0 5
Further, the Hersch/McDougall study indicates that it is not the size of the
war chest, but these other qualities, including the candidate's popularity, that
diminish the chances of serious challenge. The average war chest in their study
was only $159,000, rising to just $203,000 in races in which the incumbent
eventually ran without serious competition. 10 6 This second figure barely
reaches the lower end of the estimated fund of $200,000 to $500,000 needed
to run a competitive race at the time of the study.'07 Thus, a challenger
would normally have expected the incumbent to spend at least the amount of
103. See Philip L. Hersch & Gerald S. McDougall, Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in
Congressional Races, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 630, 630-37, 640 (1994) (examining U.S. House races during
1988 election cycle). Hersch and McDougall define a war chest as the amount of cash on hand II months
before the election, a time when challengers must usually decide whether to pursue a campaign. See id. at
635.
104. See id. at 632.
105. Hersch and McDougall suggest that by discouraging monetary expenditures on futile campaigns
against popular incumbents, war chests may actually increase efficiency in the use of campaign resources.
See id. at 634. Of course, this overlooks other benefits that may materialize from even a long-shot
challenge, such as public awareness of issues and a voting outlet for the minority of voters dissatisfied with
the incumbent. For present purposes, the key fact is that the correlation between larger war chests and less
competition does not directly support the thesis that money buys elections, but rather underscores the point
that otherwise strong candidates can usually raise large sums of money as well.
106. Id. at 635.
107. See Gary C. Jacobson, Enough is Too Much: Money and Competition in House Elections, in
ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 173, 179 (Kay Lehman Schlozman ed., 1987) (estimating that $500,000 is needed
for challenger to have realistic chance of success in U.S. House campaign in 1986); Larry Sabato, Real and
Imagined Corruption in Campaign Financing, in ELECTIONs AMERICAN STYLE 155, 169 (A. James
Reichley ed., 1987) (suggesting $150,000 was "minimum financial base needed to conduct a modem
campaign").
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the war chest, and probably more, regardless of whether the candidate had the
amount on hand well before the election. Moreover, Gary Jacobson's empirical
studies have shown that added incumbent spending yields little or no vote gain
at certain levels. 10 8 Because higher levels of spending would be of little value
to the incumbent in any case, any head start gained by amassing a war chest
would be of relatively little importance. Thus, challengers are probably not
discouraged by the presence of a war chest per se, but by what the early
accumulation of campaign funds signifies in terms of tenacity, political ability,
and popularity.'0 9
The assumption that money buys elections is based on simple correlation:
The candidate who spends the most usually wins. However, it would be
surprising if this were not the case, as contributions flow naturally to those
candidates who are popular and are perceived as having a good chance of
winning. It seems clear that many candidates win despite spending less than
their opponents, and that the correlation between spending and success is not
as strong as other indicators, such as the correlation between incumbency and
success." 0 The problem, if it exists, is not that some candidates "buy"
elections by spending too much, but that other candidates spend too little to
reach the mass of voters."'
D. Assumption Four: Money Is a Corrupting Influence on Candidates
A fundamental tenet of the reform movement is that money has corrupted
the legislative process in America." 2 Large numbers of Americans have
come to view legislative politics as a money game, in which campaign
contributions are the dominant influence on policymaking." 3
108. See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 132 (3d ed. 1992);
Jacobson, supra note 96, at 349; Jacobson, supra note 94, at 61.
109. See SORAUF, supra note 1, at 178.
110. Id. at 175-76, 178.
111. See id. at 178-79; see also Sabato. supra note 107, at 169. For a further discussion of this point,
see infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 306-35; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1126;
Wright, supra note 4, at 609-10.
113. See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1129-30 (citing polling data). In Buckley, the Supreme
Court held that the mere "appearance of corruption" is a constitutionally sufficient justification for
infringing on First Amendment rights through campaign finance regulation. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 26 (1976) (per curiam). This argument is not particularly persuasive for several reasons.
First, although the importance of appearances is discussed by Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3,
at 1130-31, among others, it is not a major argument in the campaign finance reform literature.
Second, the "appearance of corruption" rationale is both unnecessary and dangerous. If the campaign
finance system leads to actual corruption, then that may be a constitutionally sufficient justification for the
state to infringe on free speech rights, in which case the "appearance of corruption" basis is superfluous.
If the campaign system does not lead to actual corruption, then it seems very dangerous to suggest that the
mistaken view of some could justify restricting the First Amendment liberties of others. For example, if
complete campaign finance reform were insufficient to change the public's erroneous view, would the state
then be justified, under a least restrictive means test, in censoring political reporting that wrongly focuses
excess attention on money and thus itself creates the "appearance of corruption"? The justification of such
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In many respects, this would seem to be the most sound of the
fundamental reformist assumptions. Experience and human nature tell us that
legislators, like most people, are influenced by money, even when it goes into
their campaign funds rather than directly into their pockets. Many legislators
themselves have complained of the influence of money in the legislature ."
4
In fact, however, a substantial majority of those who have studied voting
patterns on a systematic basis agree that campaign contributions affect very
few votes in the legislature." 5 The primary factors determining a legislator's
votes, these studies conclude, are party affiliation, ideology, and constituent
views and needs." 6 Where contributions and voting patterns intersect, they
do so largely because donors contribute to those candidates who are believed
to favor their positions, not the other way around.
117
These empirical results cut against our intuitions. Yet to accept the
findings of these repeated studies does not require us, in Professor Nicholson's
phrase, "to park [our] common sense at the academy door."'' First, people
who are attracted to public office generally do have strong personal views on
issues." 9 Second, there are institutional and political incentives to support
restrictions by a belief known to be erroneous is a sharp departure from traditional First Amendment
doctrine. Even in the midst of World War II, the Court did not uphold a law requiring a salute of the U.S.
flag, see West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), even though a refusal to salute
the flag might have created an appearance of disunity damaging to the U.S. war effort-surely an important
government interest. See id. at 640-41. Allowing the "appearance of corruption" to justify government
intrusion on First Amendment liberties essentially allows the majority to justify the suppression of minority
rights through its own propaganda.
Third, one of the themes of this Essay is that money has not "corrupted" the system. I know of no
way to challenge the "appearance of corruption"-others' subjective perceptions that corruption does
exist-other than to make the case that their perceptions are wrong. Cf Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign
Finance and Democratic Control: Comments on Gottlieb and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
369, 377 (1989) ('To the extent that the argument verges on '[corruption is] there even if we can't see it,'
it is not.., open to disconfirmation .... ). A person swayed by the arguments in this Essay should not
much care about the "appearance of corruption."
114. See, e.g., Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1128-40.
115. See MOUSSALLI, supra note 94, at 6; SORAUF, supra note 18, at 316; Janet Grenzke, PACs and
the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex, 33 AM. J. POL. SCL. I, 1 (1989); Sabato, supra
note 107, at 159-62; cf. W.P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and
Dairy Price Supports, 35 W. POL. Q. 478, 479 (1982) ("[T]he influence of contributions is 'small,' at least
relative to the influences of constituency, party, and ideology."). But see Lowenstein, supra note 3, at
313-22 (arguing that such studies are seriously flawed).
116. Sabato, supra note 107, at 160.
117. MOUSSALLI, supra note 94, at 5-6.
118. Nicholson, supra note 3, at 464.
119. This simple observation is often missed by campaign reformers, even those with an otherwise
skeptical eye. For example, Sanford Levinson found it "scandalous" that 64 Democrats in the House of
Representatives voted for a capital gains tax cut in 1989, writing, "I cannot believe [they] would have voted
for this bill ... if they were not so dependent on campaign contributions from that sector of the population
which is most likely to benefit from the bill." Sanford Levinson, Electoral Regulation: Some Comments.
18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 411, 412 n.5 (1989). Though hotly debated, considerable literature suggests that a
reduction in capital gains tax rates would actually increase government revenue. See, e.g., George R.
Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity, 48
TAX L. REv. 419, 429-30 (1993). Perhaps these Democrats believed such arguments, and merely wanted
to cut the deficit or raise revenue to fund social programs.
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party positions. These can include logistical and financial support,1' ° appeals
to party unity,21  pressure regarding committee assignments, 122  and
promises of support from party leaders on future issues.2 3 Third, large
campaign contributors are usually offset by equally well-financed interests that
contribute to a different group of candidates. In fact, contributors frequently
suffer enormous losses in the legislative process, as funds are spent to promote
positions that ultimately fail. 124 Finally, money is not the only political
commodity of value. For example, in 1993-94 the National Rifle Association
(NRA) contributed nearly $2 million to congressional campaigns through its
PAC."z However, the NRA also has over three million members, "who
focus intently, even solely, on NRA issues in their voting."' 26 In many
congressional districts, the NRA is capable of "shift[ing] vote totals by close
to five percent."' 2 7 The NRA's power thus would seem to come more from
votes than from dollars. However, to the extent that it comes from dollars, that
too is related to votes; i.e., it is the group's large membership that yields large
amounts of contributions. Groups advocating gun control often complain that
the NRA outspends them, but rarely mention that the NRA also outvotes
them.
21
An unwillingness to accept the possibility of legislative defeat (or in this case victory-the capital
gains tax cut was defeated) on the merits tends to permeate reformist writing. See, e.g., Wright, supra note
4, at 618-19.
120. See David Adamany, Political Finance and the American Political Parties, 10 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 497, 539-41 (1983).
121. See, e.g., Norman J. Ornstein, The Rising Republican Centrists: Congress's New Power Brokers,
WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1995. at C3 (noting that in order to achieve even limited goals, pressure for party
unity grows as party's legislative strength declines).
122. See, e.g., Richard Reeves, A Matter of Conscience, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 17, 1995, at B3 (discussing
Republican pressure on Senator Mark Hatfield to give up his seat as Appropriations Committee chairman
after voting against balanced budget amendment to U.S. Constitution).
123. See, e.g., Alan McConagha, Inside Politics, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at A5 (noting that
Representative Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky cast deciding vote for President Clinton's 1994 budget
because President promised to hold conference on entitlements in her district).
124. See SORAUF, supra note 1, at 165.
125. The Top PACs of the 1993-94 Election Cycle, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Apr. 26, 1995, at 3.
126. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 166.
127. Id.
128. When confronted with a liberal Congress and President in 1993-94, money did not gain the NRA
victory over the Brady Bill or the assault weapons ban. However, the election of a new congressional
majority in 1994 may result in repeal of both of the aforementioned pieces of legislation.
Of course, the NRA is not a typical group, and is perhaps an unfair example. Professor Lowenstein
suggests that many groups lacking the NRA's level of voter support manage to obtain legislative success,
suggesting used car dealers, sugar beet growers, and members of the tobacco industry as examples. See
DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, TEACHER'S MANUAL 116 (1995). Yet
these examples are not so persuasive for the reformers' cause as it might seem. Certainly the tobacco
industry can call on large numbers of voters throughout the Upper South, and even in parts of southern
Ohio, Indiana, and Maryland, which are home to tobacco growers, processors, pickers, packagers, marketers
and more. Behind them stand millions of Americans who enjoy smoking. Over 80,000 used car dealers dot
the American landscape, employing tens of thousands of workers. Max Gates. FTC Targets Buyer's Guide
Violations, AUToMOTIVE NEWS, Mar. 27, 1995, at 46. Sugar beet growers can be found from Ohio to
California and likewise draw on a vast network of employees and suppliers for support. Combined with
the domestic corn syrup industry, beet growers provide over 420,000 jobs. David Hendee, Defending the
Sugar Program. OMAHA WORLD-HERALD. July 17. 1995, at 1.
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If campaign contributions have any meaningful effect on legislative voting
behavior, it is on a limited number of votes, generally related to specialized or
narrow issues arousing little public interest. 29 A legislator is unlikely to
accept a campaign contribution, which can be used only to attempt to sway
voters, in exchange for an unpopular vote, which definitely alienates
voters. 30 Therefore, specialized issues provide the best opportunity to trade
votes for money.'3' On these issues, prior contributions may provide the
contributor with access to the legislator or legislative staff. The contributor
may then be able to shape legislation to the extent that such efforts are not
incompatible with the dominant legislative motives of ideology, party
affiliation and agenda, and constituent views. 32 Whether or not the influence
of campaign contributions on these limited issues is good or bad depends on
one's views of the resulting legislation. The exclusion of knowledgeable
contributors from the legislative process can just as easily lead to poor
legislation with unintended consequences as can their inclusion. 33 In any
case, it must be stressed that such issues are few.
34
The motivation for efforts to limit campaign contributions and spending
may not be the belief that money sways votes in the legislature, but the fact
that many campaign finance reformers are unhappy with the ideologies and
voting tendencies of those being elected to office. 35  Campaign finance
For an excellent discussion of the complex yet limited relationship between contributors and
legislative voting, see SORAUF, supra note 18, at 307-17.
129. SoRAuF, supra note 1, at 166-67; Sabato, supra note 107, at 160. Lowenstein argues that the
emphasis on floor votes misses the point; the action may take place elsewhere in the legislative process,
such as in committee. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 313-29; see also Wertheimer & Manes, supra note
3, at 1140 ("'[The payback] may not come in a vote."' (quoting former Senator Proxmire)). This would
seem to be true at some level. But as Gary Jacobson points out, this argument suffers from the weakness
of not being open to disconfirmation. See Jacobson, supra note 113, at 377. To the extent we have
empirical data, however, it appears that the reformers consistently overstate the influence of money on the
legislative process.
130. See Strauss, supra note 92, at 1372-73.
131. See Sabato, supra note 107, at 160.
132. See id. at 160-61.
133. See Strauss, supra note 92, at 1378-79.
134. See Sabato, supra note 107, at 160. Just how many votes are affected is uncertain. Welch's study
of dairy price supports, a relatively specialized issue not usually subject to intense public scrutiny, found
that the influence of money was dwarfed by party, ideology, and constituent concerns. See Welch, supra
note 115, at 479.
135. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 346-47; see also Wright, supra note 4, at 618-19 (citing
congressional resistance to numerous "liberal" causes, including a windfall tax on oil companies,
government cost controls on hospitals, environmental legislation, regulation of auto dealers, investment
credits, and "any other legislation that affects powerful, organized interests," as evidence of need for
campaign finance restrictions).
Of course, campaign finance reform, like most issues, does not always divide along traditional
liberal/conservative lines. Many prominent conservatives, such as Barry Goldwater, have supported reform
efforts, see Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1127, while liberals such as Professor Martin Shapiro
have often remained skeptical, see Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom and Equality in Campaign
Financing, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385 (1989). This does not change the basic point that many reformers see
the issue in terms of silencing the forces that have defeated cherished legislation. Goldwater, incidentally,
would have benefited from limits on contributions, since he, more than most candidates, relied on a large
base of small donors. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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reformers sometimes seem to envision a world in which career officeholders,
freed from the corrupting influence of money, lobbyists, and, it might be said,
public opinion, would produce good, wise, and fair legislation. This notion of
the philosopher-bureaucrat, popular during the Progressive era, has been largely
discredited by modem public choice scholarship as an unattainable and, indeed,
undesirable ideal. 136 And although campaign finance reformers have long
posed as disinterested citizens seeking only good government, in fact they have
often targeted certain types of campaign activities, "at least in part because
[those activities] are closely tied to political agendas that reformers
oppose."'137 They therefore favor regulation that would tilt the electoral
process in favor of preferred candidates.
138
The available evidence simply does not show a meaningful, causal
relationship between campaign contributions and legislative voting patterns.
While campaign contributions may influence votes in a few limited cases, this
would not seem to justify wholesale regulation.
The pressure for campaign finance regulation has been based on
assumptions that are, at best, questionable, and, at worst, seriously flawed. Not
surprisingly, then, campaign finance reform efforts enacted into law have had
negative consequences for our political system.
IV. THE UNDEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REGULATION
Campaign finance reform has generally focused on three specific tactics
for promoting change: limiting contributions, whether by individuals,
corporations, or PACs; limiting campaign spending; and, ultimately, using
public funding for campaigns. '" These reform tactics have several negative
136. See Gottlieb, supra note 17, at 274-76. For a sampling of work by public choice economists, see,
e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); RANDALL G.
HOLCOMBE, AN ECONONIC ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRACY (1985); DwIGHT R. LEE & RICHARD B. MCKENZIE,
FAILURE AND PROGRESS (1993); Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, The Normative Purpose of
Economic 'Science': Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method, I INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 155 (1981).
The basic insight of public choice theory as applied to government is that government officials, like private
individuals, will attempt to maximize personal worth, whether through power, wealth, or some other benefit.
Thus, they must be checked by outside interests. See, e.g., RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, PUBLIC POLICY AND
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 5-6, 18-20 (1995); DwIGHT R. LEE & RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, REGULATING
GOVERNMENT 10-13 (1987).
137. BeVier, supra note 15, at 1061.
138. Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 939, 945 (1985).
139. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 351-60; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1131. A
fourth legislative tactic, public disclosure of campaign finance information, was included in FECA and most
state legislation regulating campaign finance, and may have even broader support. See Sabato, supra note
107, at 171. Even many ardent opponents of campaign finance reform accept the benefits of disclosure
laws. See, e.g., MOUSSALLI, supra note 94, at 20-21. My own view is that disclosure laws raise serious
First Amendment questions, and thus are not free from difficulties. See Bradley A. Smith, Congress Shall
Make No Law .... WASH. TIMES. Dec. 29, 1994, at A19. Because disclosure laws do not have the same
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consequences, which can be broadly labeled "undemocratic." Specifically,
campaign finance reform efforts entrench the status quo; make the electoral
system less responsive to popular opinion; strengthen the power of select
elites; favor wealthy individuals; and limit opportunities for "grassroots"
political activity. 4 ' This part discusses each of these consequences in turn,
assuming that any regulation exists within a system of private campaign
funding. A discussion of the consequences of public funding follows in Part V.
A. Campaign Finance Reform Entrenches the Status Quo
Campaign finance reform measures, in particular limits on contributions
and overall spending,'4 ' insulate the political system from challenge by
outsiders, and hinder the ability of challengers to compete on equal terms with
those already in power.
Contribution limits tend to favor incumbents by making it harder for
challengers to raise money and thereby make credible runs for office. 42 The
lower the contribution limit, the more difficult it becomes for a candidate to
raise money quickly from a small number of dedicated supporters. The
consequent need to raise campaign cash from a large number of small
contributors benefits those candidates who have in place a database of past
contributors, an intact campaign organization, and the ability to raise funds on
an ongoing basis from PACs. 43 This latter group consists almost entirely of
current officeholders. Thus, contribution limits hit political newcomers
type of broadly "undemocratic" consequences as the other major tactical goals of the reform movement,
this Essay does not address them.
140. Supporters of heavy campaign finance regulation argue that the failure of the 1974 FECA
Amendments, and specifically FECA's contribution and expenditure limits, to solve the alleged evils of the
current system is due to the unwarranted constitutional restrictions placed on their efforts by Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). See, e.g., Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign
Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 55 (199 1); see also John
S. Shockley, Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks to Campaign Finance Reform, 10 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 679, 714-15 (1983). This Essay demonstrates, however, that regardless of Buckley, the fundamental
assumptions of the reform effort are incorrect. The criticisms that follow do not depend on the current
constitutional regime: They would apply to FECA as originally enacted, and, to varying degrees, to the
various reformist schemes proposed in the post-Buckley world. A public policy based on flawed
assumptions is unlikely to be successful no matter how enacted.
Furthermore, the Court has not retreated from Buckley's basic holdings, and thus reformist efforts
must take the constraints of Buckley into account.
141. Limits on campaign contributions are allowed under the Buckley framework, have been enacted
into federal law, and are included in virtually every reformist-scholar proposal. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra
note 3, at 357 (recommending limiting contributions to just $100); Nicholson, supra note 3, at 47 1; Raskin
& Bonifaz, supra note 52, at 1191; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1155. Though mandatory limits
on overall spending levels are not allowed under Buckley, voluntary limits linked to the disbursement of
public funds are permitted, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-108. For an excellent discussion of the Court's
decision on this point, see Marlene A. Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations and the
Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 601 (1983).
142. Malbin, supra note 87, at 9.
143. See Colloquia, Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
161, 169 (1994) (comments of Robert Peck).
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especially hard because of the difficulties candidates with low name
recognition have in raising substantial sums of money from small contributors.
Even well-known public figures challenging the status quo have
traditionally relied on a small number of wealthy patrons to fund their
campaigns. For example, Theodore Roosevelt's 1912 Bull Moose campaign
was funded almost entirely by a handful of wealthy supporters.' 44 Senator
Eugene McCarthy's 1968 antiwar campaign relied for seed money on a handful
of six-figure donors, including Stewart Mott, who gave approximately
$210,000, and Wall Street banker Jack Dreyfus, Jr., who may have contributed
as much as $500,000.145 John Anderson would probably have had more
success in his independent campaign for the Presidency in 1980 had his
wealthy patron, the ubiquitous Mr. Mott, been able to contribute unlimited
amounts to his campaign. 46 And whereas Ross Perot's 1992 campaign was
made possible by the Supreme Court's holding in Buckley that an individual
may spend unlimited sums to advance his own candidacy, the contribution
limits upheld in Buckley would make it illegal for Perot to bankroll the
campaign of a more plausible challenger in 1996, such as Colin Powell or Bill
Bradley.' 47 Despite recent polls showing strong voter interest in a third-party
or independent candidate for President in 1996, contribution limits make a
serious independent challenge virtually impossible, unless Mr. Perot himself,
or someone of comparable wealth, is again the candidate.
Beyond making it harder for challengers to raise cash, contribution limits
also tend to decrease overall spending,4 s which further works against
challengers. Incumbents begin each campaign with significant advantages in
name recognition. 4 9 They are able to attract press coverage because of their
office, and they often receive assistance from their staffs and send constituents
postage-free mailings using their franking privilege. 50 Through patronage
144. See THAYER, supra note 22, at 55.
145. See Deposition of Eugene McCarthy, Ex. C at 50, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (No. 75-106 1), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Deposition of Stewart
R. Mott, Ex. D at S I1, Buckley, 519 F.2d 821 (No. 75-1061) [hereinafter Statement of Stewart R. Mott].
146. See generally Stewart R. Mott, Independent Fundraising for an Independent Candidate, 10
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 138-41 (1981).
147. More recently, millionaire Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., a political neophyte, declared his intention to
seek the Republican presidential nomination in 1996. Forbes indicated that he would not have sought the
nomination had former Congressman and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp decided
to run. Martha T. Moore, Main Goal: Carry Banner of Supply Side Economics, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1995,
at 4B. Kemp chose not to run in part because he did not want to engage in fund-raising. Alan Eisner,
Running for the White House 1Wll Take Megabucks This 7Tme, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1995, at A9. Were
Forbes able to donate to Kemp the $25 million he planned to spend on his own campaign, Kemp might
have run and would quite likely have been a front-runner for the Republican nomination.
148. Lowenstein, supra note 63, at 399-401. This is because a candidate's spending is limited to
available funds. By making it harder to raise money, contribution limits will indirectly lower overall
spending levels. Id.
149. Gottlieb. supra note 17, at 224.
150. Id.
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and constituent favors, they can further add to their support. 15' One way for
challengers to offset these advantages is to spend money to make their names
and positions known. Those few studies that have attempted to isolate and
quantify the effect of campaign spending on votes have found that, once a
candidate spends the minimal amount needed to penetrate the public
consciousness, additional spending affects a very limited number of votes.
152
However, the positive effect of added spending is significantly greater for
challengers than for incumbents.15 3 In fact, studies show an inverse
relationship between high levels of incumbent spending and incumbent success.
Heavy spending by an incumbent indicates that the incumbent is in electoral
trouble and facing a well-financed challenger. 54 Because an incumbent's
added spending is likely to have less of an effect on vote totals than the
additional spending of a challenger, limits on total campaign spending will hurt
challengers more than incumbents. By lowering overall campaign spending,
therefore, contribution limits further lock into place the advantages of
incumbency and disproportionately harm challengers.
Absolute spending ceilings, whether "mandatory" or "voluntary," have the
potential to exacerbate this problem considerably. 5 ' Set low enough, they
may make it impossible for challengers to attain the critical threshold at which
they can reach enough voters to run a credible race. 5 6 Overall spending caps
also prevent challengers from ever spending more than incumbents. While
spending more than one's opponent is not necessary to win an election,1
5 7
151. Id.
152. See JACOBSON, supra note 108, at 54.
153. Id. at 50, 53; Jacobson, supra note 94, at 62-63 (finding that challengers gained approximately
3.5 percentage points for each $100,000 spent, while incumbent vote totals actually went down with higher
spending). This would appear to be because the incumbents are better known to the constituency at the start
of the campaign. The advantages they gain from holding office can be viewed as money already spent in
a campaign, and indeed often reflect past campaign spending. See John R. Lott, Jr., Erplaining Challengers'
Campaign Expenditures: The Importance of Sunk Nontransferable Brand Name, 17 PUB. FIN. Q. 108
(1989). As such, incumbents will reach a point of diminishing marginal returns sooner than challengers,
with better-known and longer-serving incumbents reaching that point sooner than lesser-known and short-
term incumbents. Anecdotal evidence from the 1994 elections would seem to support this last point. The
three incumbents who lost despite spending at least $1 million more than their challengers were three of
the best-known, longest-serving incumbents in Congress: Dan Rostenkowski, Thomas Foley, and Jack
Brooks. See Money in House Seat Turnovers, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov. 23, 1994, at 3, 4.
154. JACOBSON, supra note 108, at 53.
155. Mandatory spending ceilings are not allowed under Buckley, but voluntary ceilings created by
offering public subsidies to candidates who agree to abide by the ceiling are a common feature of many
reform proposals. See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 473-75; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1149-54.
Many of these "voluntary" proposals would be prime candidates to be struck down by the Supreme Court
as violating the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. Typically, they are so punitive toward candidates
who do not opt into the system that voluntary limits are, in effect, mandatory. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS
ASSESSMENT PROJECT. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ADVANTAGE INCUMBENTS: CLINTON'S CAMPAIGN
FINANCE PROPOSAL 11 (1993) [hereinafter ADVANTAGE INCUMBENTS] (discussing reform bill proposed by
President Clinton in 1993).
156. Incumbent lawmakers will always have powerful personal incentives to set spending caps at a
level that disadvantages their challengers. See, e.g., ADVANTAGE INCUMBENTS, supra note 155, at 9-10;
Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 335.
157. See discussion supra Section III.C.
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a challenger's ability to outspend an incumbent can help to offset the
advantages of incumbency.5 8 Efforts to limit spending, whether mandatory
or through incentive-based "voluntary" caps, should therefore not be viewed
as benign or neutral.
B. Campaign Finance Reform Promotes Influence Peddling and
Reduces Accountability
Limits on contributions increase the incentives for contributors to seek
"influence" rather than the election of like-minded legislators, and reduce the
effectiveness of legislative-monitoring efforts. We have previously seen that,
though the argument is overstated, campaign contributions may affect
legislative votes on a limited number of issues. 59 Many reformers have been
more concerned about contributors who adopt a "legislative" strategy,
attempting to influence legislative votes, than with donors who adopt an
"electoral" strategy, aimed at influencing election outcomes. 60 Yet strangely
enough, contribution limits, the most popular reform measure, encourage PACs
and other monied interests to adopt legislative strategies. This results in the
representative system being less responsive to public opinion.
Campaign contributors must weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing an
electoral strategy versus a legislative strategy. Money given to a losing
challenger is not merely money wasted, it is money spent counterproductively,
as it will probably increase the enmity of, and decrease access to, the
incumbent. With incumbents winning in excess of 90% of House races, an
electoral strategy of supporting challengers has very high risks. Even in close
races, so long as a contributor is limited to a maximum contribution of $10,000
(or some other amount),' 61 the contributor's campaign donation is unlikely
to increase significantly the odds of a victory for the challenger. The low-risk
alternative is to contribute to incumbents in the hope that a legislative strategy
158. Sabato, supra note 107, at 169. Incumbency is already the single best predictor of electoral
success. Limits on campaign financing, by handicapping challengers still further, tend to add to political
ossification. Though rates of success of incumbents seeking reelection have been consistently above 75%
since the turn of the century, these rates have risen to record heights in this era of extensive campaign
finance regulation. See JOHN H. FUND, TERM LIMITATION: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 5 tbl. 2
(1990). Even in the 1994 elections, which resulted in significant political realignment, 91.4% of
congressional incumbents seeking reelection were victorious. See Edward Zuckerman, Money Didn't Matter
for Most Challengers Who Won, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov. 23, 1994, at 1, 1. The Republican gains
came primarily from the GOP's near sweep of "open" seats, i.e., seats in which the incumbent did not seek
reelection. While money can help to "buy" votes, it "buys" far more votes for challengers than for
incumbents. This being the case, money is an equalizer in the system, helping challengers to overcome the
tremendous advantages of incumbency. Ruy A. Teixeira, Campaign Reform, Political Competition, and
Citizen Participation, in RETHINKING POLITICAL REFORM: BEYOND SPENDING AND TERM LIMITS 5, 10-11
(Ruy A. Teixeira et al. eds., 1994).
159. See discussion supra Section III.D.
160. See supra note 92.
161. This is the maximum contribution for a PAC making a donation in both the primary and general
election under FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1988).
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might succeed, at least by minimizing otherwise hostile treatment aimed at the
contributor's interests. 62 Thus, because the risk of an electoral strategy is so
high, contribution limits tend to lock the rational contributor into a legislative
strategy.1 63 To the extent, then, that campaign contributions influence
legislative voting behavior, campaign finance regulation in the form of
contribution limits is likely to make the problem worse." 4
Professor Lowenstein attempts to get around this problem by setting the
contribution threshold at $100, a level so low that a legislative strategy would
have no real chance of success.' 65 This would effectively abolish private
funding of political campaigns. 166 As a practical matter, then, public funding
would have to take over the system, 67 with the attendant problems I will
shortly address. Even if public funding could be successfully implemented,
however, squeezing out private money would in other ways make the political
system less responsive.
PACs perform a valuable monitoring function in the current campaign
regime, a function that would be lost were private funding to be eliminated.
It has been suggested that the real issue that the campaign reform movement
attempts to address is "shirking," or the tendency of elected officials to betray
their public trust in favor of their own or other interests. 68 In most cases, it
will not be rational for individuals to devote considerable time to monitoring
the performance of elected officials. However, by banding together with others
having similar concerns, individuals can perform the monitoring function at a
reasonable cost. Interest groups, and the PACs they spawn, thus play an
important role in monitoring officeholders' performances so as to prevent
shirking. 69 Therefore, measures that would limit or eliminate the role of
PACs are likely to reduce legislative monitoring, leading to a legislature ever
more isolated from the people.
162. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 308-13, for a general discussion of the strategy considerations
facing donors.
163. It may be worthwhile to consider the proposition that PACs have less of a corrupting influence
on incumbent legislators than those legislators have on PACs. See Strauss, supra note 92, at 1380-82
(arguing that incumbent lawmakers may use threat of adverse legislative action to "extort" contributions
from political contributors).
164. This does not mean that large contributors, even PACs, never give to challengers. They may
gamble that a challenger can be the exception who wins, or they may be motivated purely by ideology. But
to the extent they hope to see a difference as a result of their contributions, a legislative strategy will almost
always make more sense.
165. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 357. At a maximum contribution of just $100, it is hard to see
a legislator being swayed by any single contribution. Note, however, that this would make bundling of
contributions and independent spending, two other villains in the reformist literature, more valuable.
166. See Jacobson, supra note 82, at 610-11. It is worth noting that private funding has many
advantages: It is easy to administer; it supports traditional American values of volunteerism; it avoids First
Amendment problems; and it actively involves millions of Americans in the political process far more than
does a government check-off. See Sorauf, supra note 5, at 1361.
167. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 350.
168. See Jacobson, supra note 113, at 370.
169. BeVier, supra note 89, at 1273-76.
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Finally, there is always the possibility that limiting private contributions
will simply increase the value of a more corrupting alternative: outright
bribery. 7 It is naive to think that when the government is heavily involved
in virtually every aspect of economic life in the country (and quite a few
noneconomic spheres as well), people affected by government actions will
accept whatever comes without some kind of counterstrategy.' 7' In this way,
too, contribution limits may make the electoral system less responsive to public
opinion and, therefore, less democratic.
C. Campaign Finance Regulation Favors Select Elites
Campaign finance reform is usually sold as a populist means to strengthen
the power of "ordinary" citizens against dominant, big-money interests.'72 In
fact, campaign finance reform has favored select elites and further isolated
individuals from the political process.
There are a great many sources of political influence. These include direct
personal attributes, such as speaking and writing ability, good looks,
personality, time and energy, and organizational skills, as well as acquired
attributes, such as wealth, celebrity, and access to or control of the popular
press. In any society, numerous individuals will rise to the top of their
professions to become part of an "elite." Both as a prerequisite to their success
and as a reward for it, such individuals will have certain abilities that they can
use for political ends. For example, Hollywood celebrities, by virtue of their
fame, may gain audiences for their political views that they would not
otherwise obtain. They may be invited to testify before Congress, despite their
lack of any particular expertise,'73 or they may use their celebrity to assist
campaigns through appearances at rallies.' Similarly, successful academics
may write powerful articles that change the way people think about issues.
Labor organizers may have at their disposal a vast supply of human resources
that they can use to support favored candidates. Media editors, reporters, and
anchors can shape not only the manner, but also the content, of news reporting.
Those with marketing skills can apply their abilities to raise funds or to
produce advertising for a candidate or cause. Successful entrepreneurs may
amass large sums of money that they can use for political purposes.
75
170. Professor Nicholson is right when she argues that the cost of illegal bribery is so high that most
influence seekers and peddlers will not attempt it. See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 466-68. Nevertheless,
influence seekers denied a lawful means to press their case will be more prone to consider unlawful means,
and there will always be takers at the right price.
171. BeVier, supra note 89, at 1276.
172. Sorauf, supra note 5, at 1356.
173. See, e.g., Celebrity Hearings: Much Show, Little Go, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 11,
1994, available at 1994 WL 3558496 (noting that Mei'yl Streep and Steven Spielberg both admitted their
lack of relevant knowledge during their testimony before congressional committees).
174. See Nina Easton. Star Trek: Hollywood on the Stump, L.A. TIME, Oct. 11, 1988, at 1.
175. As may most others on this list, especially celebrities.
1996] 1077
The Yale Law Journal
The regulation of campaign contributions and spending limits the political
employment of immediately available wealth but not any of these other
attributes.1 6 As an initial matter, there is no serious reason why the
successful entrepreneur should not be able to transfer her talents at creating
wealth to the political arena, while the successful marketer or political
organizer is permitted to do so. 77 There is no a priori reason why a person
with a flair for political organizing should be allowed political influence that
is denied to the person with a flair for manufacturing.
The common response to this argument is that money can buy other
sources of power: It can purchase labor, marketing know-how, media access,
even speaking coaches and improved physical appearance.'78 Not only does
this response not justify the prejudice against money, 179 however, but it is
simply incorrect, insofar as it sees this as a unique feature of money. A
winning personality, the ability to forge political alliances, and the time to
devote to politics can, like money, be used to gain access to the media, labor,
and other prerequisites to political success. Moreover, these skills, like the
ability to produce moving television ads or to write effective campaign
literature and speeches, are themselves convertible into money. For example,
money can be raised through slick direct mail pitches, operation of phone
banks, advertisements, speeches at rallies, booths at county fairs, and countless
other means. The trick to effective electoral politics is to take the assets with
which one begins and to use them to obtain additional assets that one lacks.
Money is no different.
80
Once we accept the fact that different individuals control different sources
of political power, it becomes apparent that attempts to exclude a particular
form of power-money-from politics only strengthen the position of those
whose power comes from other, nonmonetary, sources, such as time or media
access. For example, though the Supreme Court has allowed states to limit
even independent expenditures by nonmedia corporations in candidate
races,'8' newspapers, magazines, and TV and radio corporations can spend
unlimited sums to promote the election of favored candidates. Thus, Donald
Graham, the publisher of the Washington Post, has at his disposal the
176. BeVier, supra note 89, at 1268.
177. Id.
178. DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY 3 (1975).
179. See BeVier, supra note 89, at 1268.
180. As of October 1995, Senator Phil Gramm appeared to be able to convert his fund-raising skills
into a substantial campaign fund, but having gone that far, he seemed unable to use those campaign funds
to acquire other assets needed in his campaign for President. See Paul West, Pryor's Retirement Heartens
'96 GOP Hopefuls, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at 24. Conversely, there are numerous examples of
candidates beginning with little money who are able to capitalize on other attributes to raise campaign cash.
One example is President Bill Clinton, who began his 1992 presidential campaign with little cash. See Jack
W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Money is Tight for the Democratic Six, 23 NAT'L J. 2984, 2984 (1991).
181. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). For further discussion
of media influence, see Levinson, supra note 119, at 412-13.
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resources of a media empire to promote his views, free from the campaign
finance restrictions to which others are subjected. ABC News anchor Peter
Jennings is given a nightly forum on national television in which to express
his views.
182
Media elites are not the only group whose influence is increased by
campaign spending and contribution limits. Restricting the flow of money into
campaigns also increases the relative importance of in-kind contributions and
so favors those who are able to control large blocks of human resources.
Limiting contributions and expenditures does not particularly democratize the
process, but merely shifts power from those whose primary contribution is
money to those whose primary contribution is time, organization, or some
other resource-for example, from small business groups to large labor unions.
Others who benefit from campaign finance limitations include political
middlemen, public relations firms conducting "voter education" programs,
lobbyists, PACs such as EMILY's List that "bundle" large numbers of $1000
contributions,8 3 and political activists.'84 These individuals and groups may
or may not be more representative of public opinion than the wealthy
philanthropists and industrialists who financed so many past campaigns.
In theory, it may be possible to limit in-kind contributions in the same
manner as monetary contributions.'85 In practice, however, such an effort
raises almost insurmountable administrative difficulties and, in the end, would
not solve the unequal treatment created by the prejudice against money.
Consider, for example, a politically talented, twenty-five-year-old Harvard law
student from a privileged background, who chooses to volunteer on a
presidential campaign during summer break, passing up a law firm clerkship
paying $15,000 for the summer. Consider, at the same time, a West Virginia
high school dropout who goes to work in a body shop at age seventeen,
scrapes together some money to launch his own shop at age twenty-two, opens
a second shop two years later, and then at age twenty-five, angered over
government policies affecting his business, seeks to promote political change
182. Surveys have indicated that the views of journalists often differ sharply from those of the public
at large. See Stanley Meisler, Public Found to be More Cynical Than Press, L.A. TIMEs, May 22, 1995,
at AII (noting that only 5% of journalists, versus 39% of the public, describe themselves as politically
"conservative"). For an ex-joumalist's view of this power, see Jonathan Rowe, The View of You from the
Hill, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., July 1994, at 47.
183. "Bundling" is a practice in which a PAC solicits its supporters for contributions not only to the
PAC itself, but directly to the candidates. The PAC collects those campaign donations, "bundles" them
together, and delivers them to the candidate on behalf of the individual donors.
184. See, e.g., Money in Politics, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 466, 486 (1983) (providing comments
of Herbert Alexander).
185. Several proposals to limit in-kind contributions have been made. See, e.g., Carville B. Collins,
Maryland Campaign Finance Law: A Proposal for Reform, 47 MD. L. REv. 524, 544-46 (1988);
Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 3, at 1557-58. For a more theoretical discussion of the administrative
problems involved with limiting in-kind contributions, see Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A
Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204. 1246-49 (1994). Reformist
scholars, however, choose almost exclusively to target the influence of money.
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by contributing $15,000 to a political campaign. Each individual seeks to
forego $15,000 in consumption to promote his political beliefs, but only the
activities of the Harvard law student are legal. 186 As this simple illustration
shows, truly limiting the comparative advantages of in-kind contributions is
simply not possible. How, for example, would we limit the ability of Arnold
Schwarzenegger to turn his celebrity into Republican votes in any manner
compatible with the First Amendment? Could we order Republican media whiz
Roger Ailes to divide his time evenly between Democratic and Republican
candidates? Prohibit Meryl Streep from giving congressional testimony? Order
Jesse Jackson to cease his voter registration campaigns, which are clearly
aimed at registering more probable Democratic than Republican voters?'
87
The question is whether people will be allowed to convert their varied talents
into political influence. Efforts to limit the flow of cash exclude from the
process those whose talents do not directly lend themselves to political
purposes, thereby increasing the relative power of those whose talents are
directly applicable to the political arena.
Moreover, the way in which campaign finance regulation favors certain
elites raises First Amendment concerns. Traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence requires most speech restrictions to be content-neutral, i.e., not
to favor any particular viewpoint.'8 8 Even those critical of Buckley v. Valeo
have recognized that content-neutrality is necessary to uphold campaign
finance legislation.'89 Many reformers, however, usually political liberals,
view campaign finance reform favorably precisely because they assume that
the targeted power base of money works mainly to the advantage of their
political opponents. 190 Once it is conceded that legislation is intended to
hamper the expression of some ideas and not others, it is difficult to assert that
the regulation is content-neutral.
Favoring nonmonetary elites is also problematic in light of the reformers'
goal of achieving political equality. The targeting of a single source of political
power, money, does not necessarily make the system more responsive to the
interests of the middle and working classes. It is a serious mistake to assume
that all members of any one elite group, be it journalists, academics,
celebrities, or businesspeople, think alike. As Professor Lillian BeVier points
out, such an assumption rests on a group mentality and, at least where money
186. Looked at from the campaign's point of view, one might argue that the law student's real
contribution is only what it would cost the campaign to hire someone else to do the same job. The
hypothetical remains the same, of course, if the body shop owner's contribution is merely reduced to this
amount.
187. A full discussion of the relationship between money and political equality is beyond the scope
of this Essay. For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Money,
and Political Equality (unpublished manuscript in progress, on file with author).
188. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 798 (2d ed. 1988).
189. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 138, at 943 (describing views of John Rawls).
190. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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is concerned, relies on a rather callow and unsubstantiated notion of a society
irretrievably divided between some group known as the "rich," all having
similar views and interests, and another group, the "poor," who share a
different set of common views and interests.' 9'
However, to the extent that differing opinions on issues may be generally
held within different elites, the ordinary public is best served by allowing for
the interplay among those elites, rather than attempting to exclude a single
elite.'92 Efforts to ensure "equality" of inputs to the campaign process are
less likely to guarantee popular control than is the presence of multiple sources
of political power.'93 By decreasing the number of voices in the political
debate, a strategy of silencing one source of influence increases the power of
groups whose forms of contribution remain unregulated. By creating added
instability and a decentralization of power, the interplay of numerous elites
may increase opportunities for traditionally less empowered groups to obtain
influence. 19
D. Campaign Finance Limitations Favor Wealthy Candidates
Though campaign finance restrictions aim to reduce the role of money in
politics, they have helped to renew the phenomenon of the "millionaire
candidate"-with Michael Huffington and Ross Perot as only the most
celebrated recent examples. 95 In the Buckley decision, the Supreme Court
held that Congress could not limit the amount that a candidate could spend on
his or her own campaign. Contribution limits, however, force candidates to
raise funds from the public only in small amounts. The ability to spend
unlimited amounts, coupled with restrictions on raising outside money, favors
those candidates who can contribute large sums to their own campaigns from
personal assets. A Michael Huffington, Herb Kohl, or Jay Rockefeller becomes
a particularly viable candidate precisely because personal wealth provides a
direct campaign advantage that cannot be offset by a large contributor to the
opposing candidate. 96 These candidates represent an array of views across
191. BeVier, supra note 89, at 1268-69.
192. See generally Gottlieb, supra note 17, at 271-72 (arguing that presence of fewer power bases
fosters tendency towards "oligarchy," which can be offset by "multiple sources of power"). At the risk of
being accused of gratuitously hauling out the heavy artillery of political discourse, see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing control of faction by interplay).
193. See Gottlieb, supra note 17, at 271 (citing POWER, INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 7
(Ian Shapiro & Grant Reeher eds., 1988)).
194. See id. at 272.
195. Burke, supra note 63, at 357 (noting that over half of U.S. Senators are millionaires).
196. In 1994, Huffington spent approximately $24 million of his own fortune to run for the U.S.
Senate. High-cost Campaigns, supra note 86, at 8A. By September 30, 1994, Kohl had contributed almost
$4 million to his 1994 reelection effort. Edward Kennedy and Mitt Romney each loaned or contributed $2
million to their campaigns for U.S. Senate in Massachusetts. Senate Candidates Add $31.5 Million to Their
Own Election Campaigns, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Oct. 26, 1994, at I, 3. Physician Bill Frist of
Tennessee ($3.75 million) was another big spender. See Edward Roeder, Big Money Won the Day Last
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the political spectrum. The point is not that these "rich" candidates hold
uniform views but, more simply, that a system favoring personal wealth in
candidates will restrict the number of viable candidates, potentially limiting
voter choice. While most reformers have criticized Buckley for creating
precisely this situation, it seems a mistake to exacerbate the problem through
added regulation as long as Buckley remains law.
At the same time that contribution limits help independently wealthy
candidates, they may harm working-class political interests. Historically,
candidates with large constituencies among the poor and the working class
have obtained their campaign funds from a small base of wealthy donors.'97
By limiting the ability of wealthy individuals such as Stewart Mott to finance
these efforts, regulations may harm working-class constituencies. Supporters
of these candidates simply do not have the funds to compete with other
constituencies and candidates. As Stephen Gottlieb has pointed out, "candidates
with many supporters who can afford to give the legal limit may be relatively
unscathed by 'reform' legislation. As a consequence, it appears that national
campaign 'reform' legislation has benefitted the wealthy at the expense of the
working class."'
' 98
E. Campaign Finance Regulation Favors Special Interests over
Grassroots Activity
Campaign finance regulation is also undemocratic in that it favors well-
organized special interests over grassroots political activity. 99 Limitations on
contributions and spending, by definition, require significant regulation of the
campaign process, including substantial reporting requirements as to the
amounts spent and the sources of funds. Typically, regulation favors those
November, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 25, 1994, at I-C. On the House side, Republican Gene Fontenot
($2 million) and Democrat Robert Schuster ($1.1 million) provided much of their own campaign financing.
Edward Zuckerman, Money Didn't Matter for Most Challengers Who Won, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov.
23, 1994, at 1, 4.
197. Gottlieb, supra note 17, at 220-21.
198. Id. at 221 (footnote omitted). It is worth noting that this dynamic would exist, albeit to a lesser
extent, even at Lowenstein's suggested $100 contribution limit.
199. See id. at 225 n.61, and sources cited therein.
Of course, one person's "special interest" is another's "grassroots lobby," and vice versa. By "special
interest," I mean a person ar group seeking to influence legislation and government policy, usually in
pursuit of a narrowly defined economic interest, typically employing professional staff, and usually having
a strong, top-down leadership structure. Such a group is usually more concerned with influencing legislative
than public opinion. By a "grassroots lobby," I mean a group that tends to operate outside of traditional
centers of political leadership, that typically relies more heavily on volunteer help and a decentralized
structure, and that is more likely to be ideologically motivated, even if focused on a narrow issue. Such
a group would be somewhat more populist and would usually aim not to influence legislative opinion
directly so much as to influence public opinion and awareness and make public opinion known to
legislators. I recognize that these definitions are far from precise. The point is that campaign finance
regulation leads to a professionalization of politics that may alienate more typical voters and hinder local,
volunteer, and unorganized or less organized activity. In discussing "grassroots activity" in this section, I
refer to political activity other than the giving of money.
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already familiar with the regulatory machinery and those with the money and
sophistication to hire the lawyers, accountants, and lobbyists needed to comply
with complex filing requirements."' Such regulation will naturally
disadvantage newcomers to the political arena, especially those who are
themselves less educated or less able to pay for professional services. Efforts
to regulate campaigns in favor of small contributors thus have the perverse
effect of professionalizing politics and distancing the system from "ordinary"
citizens.
Regulation also creates opportunities to gain an advantage over an
opponent through use of the regulatory process, and litigation has now become
"a major campaign tactic. 20' Again, one can expect such tactics to be used
most often by those already familiar with the rules. Indeed, there is some
evidence that campaign enforcement actions are disproportionately directed at
challengers, who are less likely to have staff familiar with the intricacies of
campaign finance regulation. 02
Perhaps those most likely to run afoul of campaign finance laws, and thus
to be vulnerable to legal manipulations aimed at driving them from the
political debate, are unaffiliated individuals engaged in true grassroots
activities. For example, in 1991, the Los Angeles Times found that sixty-two
individuals had violated FECA contribution limits by making total
contributions of more than $25,000 to candidates in the 1990 elections.2 3 As
the Times noted, while many of these sixty-two were "[s]uccessful business
people" who "usually have the benefit of expert legal advice on the intricacies
of federal election laws," the next largest group of violators consisted of
"[e]lderly persons... with little grasp of the federal campaign laws."
204
Threats of prosecution have, in fact, been used in efforts to silence dissent
from those without "the benefit of expert legal advice on the intricacies of
federal election laws. 205
200. See Mott, supra note 146, at 135.
Although the necessary legal expertise can be bought, the cost will often be higher for candidates and
groups with no prior experience. In local races, funds may not be available to counter the expertise gained
by incumbents through experience. And, of course, it would seem to cut against the grain of the entire
reformist effort to increase the importance of specialized legal skills, not to mention the availability of
funds to pay for those skills, in determining who wins a campaign.
201. MOUSSALLI, supra note 94, at 9.
202. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. at 12-14,
Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.) (Nos. 88-3131 & 88-3132), cert. dismissed,
502 U.S. 1022 (1991) (noting that Ohio Election Code has been enforced almost exclusively against
challengers).
203. See Sara Fritz & Dwight Morris, Federal Election Panel Not Enforcing Limit on Campaign
Donations, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1991, at Al, A8-A9.
204. Id. at Al, AS-A9.
205. Id. at A9. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995), Margaret
McIntyre, an Ohio housewife, was fined by the Ohio Elections Commission for the peaceful distribution
of truthful campaign literature outside a public meeting. Ms. McIntyre was distributing flyers in opposition
to a school tax levy and had signed her brochures simply, "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." An
assistant school superintendent first threatened McIntyre and later brought charges against her for violating
an Ohio law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. Only after seven years of
1996] 1083
The Yale Law Journal
Even sophisticated interest groups have found campaign finance laws to
be a substantial hindrance to grassroots campaign activity and voter education
efforts. In 1994, for example, both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
American Medical Association (AMA) decided not to publish and distribute
candidate endorsements to thousands of their dues-paying members, in
response to threats of litigation from the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
Under FEC regulations, only sixty-three of the Chamber's 220,000 dues-paying
members qualified as "members" for the purposes of receiving the
organization's political communications. Similarly, the FEC had held that it
would be unlawful for the AMA to distribute endorsements to some 44,500 of
its dues-paying members. One AMA lawyer noted that, under the
circumstances, communicating endorsements to its dues-paying members was
not "worth the legal risk.
2 6
Campaign finance regulation has been packaged as a means of returning
power to "ordinary people." In truth, however, such regulation acts to exclude
ordinary people from the political process in a variety of ways: It insulates
incumbents from the voting public, in both the electoral and legislative
spheres; it increases the ability of certain elites to dominate the debate by
eliminating competing voices; it places a renewed premium on personal wealth
in political candidates; and it hampers grassroots political activity. These
problems are not the result of a poorly designed regulatory structure, but rather
the inevitable result of a regulatory structure built on faulty assumptions.2 7
V. SOME COMMENTS ON PUBLIC FUNDING
The criticisms leveled against campaign finance reform efforts in Part IV
assumed a system of private campaign funding. However, the ultimate goal of
a significant part of the reform movement is to entirely replace private funding
of campaigns with public financing.20 8 Public financing would, it is
suggested, remove the allegedly corrupting influence of money, place
candidates for office on equal footing, and relieve candidates of the need for
constant fund-raising. In fact, public financing is unlikely to achieve these
goals, does not eliminate the undemocratic effects described in the preceding
part, and raises significant problems in its own right.20 9
litigation was McIntyre exonerated by the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, the State had argued
that the Court's failure to uphold such regulation would make Buckley unenforceable. See Respondent's
Brief at 20, McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (No. 93-986).
206. Edward Zuckerman, Speechless in D.C., POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov. 9, 1994, at I. 2. The
regulation in question was struck down by the D.C. Circuit approximately one year after the 1994 elections.
See Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, No. 94-5339, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31925 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 1995).
207. See supra Part III.
208. See, e.g., Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 52, at 1174-89 (arguing that Constitution requires public
financing of campaigns).
209. The public generally opposes public financing. A December, 1990 NBC News/Wall Street Journal
poll found public funding opposed by 55% to 38%. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 145. A January, 1990 ABC
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Most public-financing proposals are tied to limitations on the expenditure
of private funds."0 Although the Supreme Court has held that Congress may
not directly limit spending by candidates, 2n Congress may link the receipt
of public funds to voluntary spending limits.212 By operating as a spending
cap, however, public funding would, like other campaign finance reforms,
favor incumbents against challengers 213 by further adding to incumbent
advantages.214 Moreover, this problem might be exacerbated because
incumbents would have incentives to set spending limits at levels that work in
their favor.215
Some political scientists have responded to this argument by suggesting
that public financing should not serve as a cap on expenditures, but rather as
News/W~ashington Post poll found 31% opposed, 20% in favor, and 49% undecided. Id. at 146. Some polls
have shown more favorable responses to public financing. For example, a 1990 Greenberg-Lake/The
Analysis Group poll found 58% in favor and 33% opposed. Id. at 145. However, that survey also showed
that 60% of voters were against public financing when told that it would result in taxpayers paying for
negative advertising. Id.; see also Russ Hemphill, Public Rejects Paying for Campaigns: Poll Finds Little
Support for Higher Taxes, PHOENIX GAZETE, Sept. 22, 1993, at B3 (providing results of poll in which
more than 75% of Phoenix voters opposed public financing of city council campaigns). The public has also
refused to support public financing at the ballot box or through tax returns. Voters have overwhelmingly
defeated public-financing referenda in California, Elmer Enstrom Jr., Subsidizing Candidates: Californians
Could Pay Despite Voter Opposition, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 4, 1993, available at 1993 WL
11764091, and Phoenix, Arizona, Phoenix Election Post-Mortem: An Anti-Crime Mandate, ARIZ. REPULIBC,
Oct. 7, 1993, at B8. Only 14.2% of Americans voluntarily contributed to the presidential campaign fund
through check-offs on their 1994 tax returns. Tom Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at
Al. Minnesota's state check-off system also has participation rates below 20%. SORAUF. supra note 1, at
143.
Of course, the lack of public support is not an insurmountable barrier: Presumably a well-organized
campaign (perhaps financed by large private contributions) could convince a majority of the public that
election financing is a good use of tax dollars.
There are also numerous administrative problems related to public-financing schemes, including: the
allocation of funds to third parties and independents, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,293 (1976) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); whether to allocate funds on a matching formula, Schotland, supra note 17, at 458-59;
setting workable spending levels for races in vastly differing districts, id. at 456; enforcement, id. at 460;
and cost. Although these difficulties should not be dismissed quickly, they can probably be addressed in
a reasonable, if not wholly satisfactory, manner (at least if implementing public funding is the primary
goal). My focus here is on more normative difficulties.
210. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 354-59; Nicholson, supra note 3, at 475-78; Wertheimer
& Manes, supra note 3, at 1149-54.
211. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54-59.
212. Id. at 85-109. However, the penalties for failing to accept "voluntary" limits may not be so steep
as to amount to de facto compulsion under the Court's "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. See. e.g.,
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) ("The doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.").
President Clinton's 1993 campaign finance proposal may have crossed the line into unconstitutional
conditions by including significant penalties for candidates who did not accept the voluntary limits, coupled
with substantial added subsidies to their competitors. See ADVANTAGE INCUMBENTS, supra note 155, at 11.
213. See supra Section IV.A.
214. Professor Nicholson, at least, is willing to live with this result. See Nicholson, supra note 3, at
475.
215. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1402-03; see also Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 335 (noting that
President Bush's 1989 campaign finance proposals would have favored Republicans and that those
proposing reform in Congress generally design plans benefiting their own party).
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a floor.216 Under this theory, public financing would be used to assure that
each major-party candidate had sufficient funds to run a minimally competitive
race for office. Candidates could then supplement their public funds with
unlimited private spending. Such an approach would avoid the disadvantages
of spending and contribution limits and would, perhaps, help to make more
campaigns competitive. However, it would leave unaddressed the central
concerns of the reformers-the supposedly corrupting influence of private
money on the political system and alleged political inequality-thereby
undercutting much of the basic rationale for public funding. Public funding
could still address these issues indirectly, by making the "floor" so high that
spending private funds above the floor would yield only very marginal, or even
zero, returns. But leaving aside the public expense that such a high floor would
entail, making private spending meaningless would have many of the same
undemocratic consequences as would contribution limits in a system of private
financing. It would remove incentives for legislative monitoring by groups and
individuals;217 it would drive one source of political power from the field,
thereby increasing the influence of elites who draw power from other
sources; 2t8 and it might foster the more traditional corruption of outright
bribery.21 9 Thus, besides creating difficult administrative hurdles, public
funding could be expected to produce many of the same problems that reform
efforts produce in the context of private funding.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE UTILITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT
Professor Schotland has argued that the great dilemma of campaign finance
is how to maintain political equality in a society that accepts economic
inequality.220 This theme is a recurrent one in the literature of campaign
finance reform 22 1-it focuses on the perceived tension between the First
Amendment's role in protecting individual liberty and its role in promoting
self-government and societal benefits.222 This part will suggest that this
formulation is incorrect, and that the conflict perceived by reform advocates
does not, in fact, exist. Properly understood, the First Amendment serves both
the libertarian goals of some reform critics and the egalitarian goals of
reformers.
216. See Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: Towards a New
Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, I J.L. & POL. 211, 230-34 (1984); Sabato, supra note 107, at 169.
217. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Section IV.C.
219. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
220. See Schotland, supra note 17, at 435.
221. See, e.g., Edwin B. Firmage & Kay Christensen, Speech and Campaign Reform: Congress, the
Courts and Community, 14 GA. L. REV. 195, 218 (1980); Shockley, supra note 140, at 691-99; Strauss,
supra note 92, at 1383-85; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1413.
222. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 135, at 393-94.
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Early thought on the First Amendment tended to view it in terms of an
individual liberty interest. Thomas Jefferson, for example, saw freedom of
opinion as a "natural right" of the individual.2 3 Another view, which was
dominant by the latter part of the nineteenth century, was that the First
Amendment, though based on individual liberty interests, served merely to
codify common law rights inherited by the American colonists from their
English ancestors.224 Neither Jefferson's view, nor the common law view,
provided an absolute liberty in speech. Jefferson allowed for limitations on
libelous speech.2 The common law allowed for the speaker to be punished
for libelous, obscene, or blasphemous speech, 26 but clearly prohibited prior
restraints.227 Beginning around 1870, a third strain of First Amendment
jurisprudence emerged. This was a judicial laissez-faire ideology that offered
greater protection to speech based on the lack of legitimate authority for state
interference in private speech.228
Progressive reformers at the turn of the century were generally pleased by
the notion of greater speech protection offered by this third strain of thought,
but unhappy with basing that support on an individual liberty interest that
might also be used to strike down economic regulation. 229 Thus, Progressive
thinkers began to develop a new rationale for broad protection of free speech:
Speech was not to be protected as a liberty interest, but as a prerequisite to a
properly functioning democracy. 0 Particularly influential in this effort was
Zechariah Chafee. Chafee was not unmindful of the liberty interest in speech,
but argued that "it is useless to define free speech by talk about rights.' 'ast
"The true meaning of freedom of speech," he wrote, "is the discovery and
spread of truth on subjects of general concern. 232 In the Chafee formulation,
soon promoted on the Supreme Court by Oliver Wendell Holmes,233 the right
to free speech became a utilitarian instrument for administering government,
rather than a natural right or a right inherited from the common law that would
be, in Jefferson's words, "useless to surrender to the government."
4
Chafee's de-emphasis of the individual liberty interest in speech did not
lead initially to a lower threshold of constitutional protection, but instead to
223. DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 159 (1994).
224. G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391, 398 (1992).
225. MAYER, supra note 223, at 171.
226. White, supra note 224, at 398.
227. Id. Jefferson's views, which are typical of radical Whig thought at the time, may have shifted
to a more absolutist position after passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. MAYER, supra note 223, at
173-74.
228. White, supra note 224, at 403-06.
229. Id. at 406.
230. Id. at 407.
231. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932, 957 (1919).
232. Id. at 956.
233. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
234. MAYER, supra note 223, at 155 (quoting Jefferson).
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arguably greater protection than speech had ever before enjoyed, at least so
long as that speech contained some political element. By mid-century, the great
First Amendment theorist, Alexander Meiklejohn, argued that, as applied to
political speech, the First Amendment was all but absolute.235 Nevertheless,
the "self-governance" theory of the First Amendment articulated by Chafee and
Meiklejohn eroded the traditional individual liberty justification for protecting
free speech. Without this underpinning, when Meiklejohn's absolutist utilitarian
236view was challenged, intrusions on free speech rights became harder to
resist-particularly when those intrusions were effected in the name of
furthering self-governance. By 1961, even Meiklejohn would write, "A citizen
may be told when and where and in what manner he may or may not speak,
write, assemble, and so on. 237 The Supreme Court, too, seemed to move in
this direction, approvingly quoting Meiklejohn in a 1973 opinion for the
proposition that the First Amendment is intended to ensure not that speech is
unrestricted but rather that all voices are heard.238
In 1975, the D.C. Circuit upheld FECA in its entirety on this basic
rationale.239 According to the opinion written by Judge Tamm in Buckley, the
equality principle inherent in the First Amendment justified the regulation. 40
The Supreme Court reversed much of the circuit court's opinion and struck
down many parts of the Act.241 In doing so, the Court rejected the pro-FECA
equality argument,242 and appeared to return to the -old "individual liberty
interest" mode of analysis.243 The debate that has taken place since has often
been a battle between these conflicting views.2" Opponents of reform have
argued from an individual rights-based point of view.24 Reformers have
argued that the First Amendment is properly understood as a utilitarian
measure. They claim that it ought not to be interpreted to restrain most
campaign finance regulations 246 and that it could in some cases even be
235. ALEXANDER MEIKLFJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27, 91
(1948). Meiklejohn did seem to leave open the question, however, as to whether or not the First
Amendment protected lobbyists. See id. at 99. Meiklejohn's absolutist position went beyond anything that
Chafee had envisioned. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949).
236. See Chafee, supra note 235, at 898-901.
237. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REv. 245, 257.
238. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973).
239. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam).
240. Id. at 897.
241. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
242. Id. at 15-17, 19-22, 25-26.
243. See Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 360 (1977);
Polsby, supra note 16, at 17.
244. For examples of authors arguing that First Amendment values may require limits on the speech
of some individuals, see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 49; Fiss, supra note 4, at 1405. The opposing,
libertarian view is well represented by, among others, RALPH K. WINTER, JR. & JOHN R. BOLTON,
CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM (1973); BeVier, supra note 15; Polsby, supra note 16.
245. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 89, at 1258.
246. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 4, at 1425 ("[U]nless the Court allows, and sometimes even requires,
the state to [restrict the speech of some elements of society], we as a people will never truly be free.");
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interpreted to require them247 as a means of promoting a principle of equality
they consider inherent in our system of self-governance.
The end result of a debate structured in this manner is that the defense of
the right to unabridged speech has been left largely to conservatives who have
less concern over alleged inequalities.2 s Martin Shapiro writes:
[A]lmost the entire first amendment literature produced by liberal
academics in the past twenty years has been a literature of regulation,
not freedom-a literature that balances away speech rights .... Its
basic strategy is to treat freedom of speech not as an end in itself, but
an instrumental value .... 24'
Professor Shapiro is clearly dismayed by this turn of events.20 But Shapiro's
fears have not moved those who have made clear their desire to balance First
Amendment rights away. For that reason, this Essay, while not conceding the
individual liberty interpretation of the First Amendment, has attempted to
address the reformist literature on its own, utilitarian terms. In doing so, it has
argued that the reformist approach has been based on assumptions that are, at
best, significantly overstated, and, at worst, wrong. Moreover, after twenty
years of balancing speech rights away, liberal scholarship is in danger of losing
the ability to see the First Amendment as anything but a libertarian barrier to
equality that may, and indeed ought, to be balanced away or avoided with little
thought.251 Even when the reform literature has expressed concern over the
consequences of its proposals, it has done so with the certainty that the First
Amendment must, nonetheless, give way. This is a serious error.
Twenty years of FECA and similar state laws have not only failed to
deliver on reformist promises, 2  but, as this Essay has argued, have
themselves had undemocratic consequences for the electoral system. Further,
the problems created by reform efforts cannot be explained away simply by
pointing to the truncated nature of permissible reform after Buckley. Such
Leventhal, supra note 243, at 387 (arguing that because "[n]ew political structures and processes are needed
for our dynamic society," courts should proceed cautiously in striking down reform measures); Shockley,
supra note 140, at 697 (arguing that Supreme Court's Buckley decision "certainly goes against some of the
basic ideas of the meaning of the First Amendment"); Strauss, supra note 92, at 1385 (arguing that if
equality in voting is required, it "is difficult to see why" contributions cannot be limited to assure equality);
Wright, supra note 4, at 609 ("Campaign spending reform is imperative to serve the purposes of freedom
of expression.").
247. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 185 (arguing that Constitution requires that financial participation in
politics be equalized through a system of subsidies and taxes); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 52 (arguing
that Constitution requires public funding of campaigns).
248. See. e.g.. Buckley. 424 U.S. at 235-55 (Burger, C.., concurring in part & dissenting in part);
Polsby, supra note 16: Ralph K. Winter, Political Financing and the Constitution, 486 ANNALs AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. So. 34 (1986).
249. Shapiro, supra note 135, at 393.
250. See id. at 394 (noting that such regulation raises "a very particular danger").
251. See Fiss. supra note 4, at 1425.
252. Burke, supra note 63. at 391 (discussing federal laws).
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problems would exist even if Buckley were overturned and the reformist
legislative goals were realized. Efforts to drive money from the playing field
of politics will entrench incumbents, make the system less responsive to
popular opinion, concentrate power in the hands of select elites, and depress
grassroots political activity.
Reformers, after years of citing First Amendment "values" as a
justification for limits on speech rights, 3 seem content to ignore the actual
language of the First Amendment, which prohibits such abridgements of
speech. In making this leap, they appear not to have considered the possibility
that the First Amendment should itself be seen as a considered response to
problems inherent in any democratic system of elections.
By assuring freedom of speech and of the press, the First Amendment
allows for exposure of government corruption and improper favors and
provides voters with information on sources of financial support. There is no
shortage of newspaper articles reporting on candidate spending and campaign
contributions, and candidates frequently make such information an issue in
campaigns. By keeping the government out of the electoral arena, the First
Amendment allows for a full interplay of political ideas and prohibits the type
of incumbent self-dealing that has so vexed the reform movement. It allows
challengers to raise the funds necessary for a successful campaign and keeps
channels of political change open. By prohibiting excessive regulation of
political speech and the political process, the First Amendment, properly
interpreted, frees individuals wishing to engage in political discourse from the
regulation that now restrains grassroots political activity. And because the First
Amendment, properly applied to protect contributions and spending, makes no
distinctions between the power bases of different political actors, it helps to
keep any particular faction or interest from permanently gaining the upper
hand. In each respect, it promotes true political equality.
What the First Amendment does not do is promise a neat and tidy system
of elections. Campaign finance reformers, focused on the untidiness of the
process, which they have labeled "corruption," have responded with an ever
growing web of regulation. This has served only to distance Americans from
politics and politicians and has thus led to a decline in the public's trust in
government.
The problems of self-government in the twenty-first century are unlikely
to be resolved by piling more regulations on top of a failed system of
campaign finance regulation. Instead, we should recognize the flawed
assumptions that have motivated campaign finance reform efforts and the
undemocratic consequences that have resulted. Doing so may enable us to take
more seriously the benefits of the system of campaign finance regulation that
253. See Fiss, supra note 4, at 1408-13; Shockley, supra note 140, at 691-99; Sunstein, supra note
14, at 1413; Wright, supra note 4, at 626-31.
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the Founders wrote into the Bill of Rights-both as an end in itself and as an
instrumental value to the goal of a functioning democracy. That system is a
simple one. It begins: "Congress shall make no law ....
254. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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